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THE NEW ANTIFRAUD RULE:
IS SEC ENFORCEMENT THE MOST EFFECTIVE
WAY TO PROTECT INVESTORS FROM HEDGE
FUND FRAUD?
Kathleen E. Lange*
Hedge funds have consistently grown in both size and influence.
Traditionally, hedge funds escaped regulation because access was limited
to the wealthy and sophisticated. However, due to inflation, the wealth
threshold has become more attainable to less sophisticated investors. Also,
an increasing number of pension funds and other institutional investors
have begun to invest a significant portion of their money in hedge funds.
This increased growth, combined with the "retailization" of the industry,
has led to concern over whether investors are adequately protected from
the corresponding growth in hedge fund fraud. This Note argues that,
absent new legislation, the SEC cannot effectively protect investors, but it
suggests that the creation of a self-regulatory organization for hedge funds
might provide the best protection for these investors.
INTRODUCTION
In 1996, Samuel Israel III and Daniel Marino started the Bayou Fund, a
"private pooled investment fund, known as a 'hedge fund."'" Within only a
few months, the fund sustained heavy trading losses.2 Israel and Marino
concealed these losses from Bayou's early investors by lying to them about
"the Fund's performance and the value of the investors' accounts." 3 In
* J.D. Candidate, 2009, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2005, Fairfield
University. I would like to thank Professor Sean Griffith for his invaluable guidance, my
family for their unwavering support, and Arnie Jacobs for being the best mentor for which an
aspiring lawyer could ask.
1. Complaint at 5, SEC v. Israel, No. 05 civ. 8376 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2005)
[hereinafter Israel Complaint]. "The Bayou Fund apparently was conceived as a real hedge
fund that traded securities." Id. at 2. In January 2003, the Bayou Fund was reorganized and
liquidated to create four separate hedge funds: Bayou Accredited Fund, LLC; Bayou
Affiliates Fund, LLC; Bayou No Leverage Fund, LLC; and Bayou Superfund, LLC. Id. at 5.
2. Id. at 5.
3. Id. at 2 (alleging defendants "knowingly misrepresented the value and performance
of the Bayou Fund and the four successor Funds to clients; [and] issued false and misleading
financial statements, account statements and performance summary documents"); see also
Greg Farrell, Empty Promises in Hedge Fund Fraud: SEC Says Bayou's Executives
Deceived Investors from Start, USA TODAY, Sept. 30, 2005, at B3 (reporting that Samuel
Israel and Daniel Marino "disguised trading losses from Bayou's early investors by lying
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* 1998, the fund "sustained a net loss of millions of dollars from trading," and
by year end, Israel and Marino could no longer manipulate the fund's
records to conceal the mounting losses and withstand an independent audit.4
Instead of admitting their losses, Israel and Marino fired their independent
auditing firm, and Marino created "Richmond-Fairfield Associates," a
"fictitious accounting firm" that he used to produce fabricated "auditor's
reports, financial statements, and performance summaries."' 5  After
continued losses in 1999, Israel and Marino "again concealed the loss by
creating and distributing to the fund's investors false performance
summaries and a false financial statement that had purportedly been audited
by Richmond-Fairfield Associates." 6 According to the complaint filed by
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Bayou and its successor
funds received over $450 million from investors between Bayou's inception
in 1996 and July 31, 2005.7 Despite continued losses, Israel and Marino
continued to solicit capital from both new and current investors.8 In 2003
alone, Israel and Marino received more than $125 million from investors.9
Although Bayou never actually operated at a profit, Israel and Marino paid
themselves "incentive fees" based on fictionalized profits. 10
In April 2004, Israel and Marino suspended most trading, "drained
virtually all of the [flunds' prime brokerage accounts, and wired the
remaining funds, approximately $150 million, into Bayou Management's
account at Citibank."" With the remaining money, Israel continued to
"invest in a series of prime bank instrument trading programs."' 2 In a letter
from Israel and Marino dated July 27, 2005, investors were informed that
the Bayou funds were voluntarily liquidating and that "ninety percent of the
clients' capital balances would be distributed by August 12, 2005, with the
remaining ten percent to follow at the end of the month." 13 In a subsequent
letter dated August 11, 2005, Israel promised clients that "they would
about the fund's performance and padding the results with infusions of cash from Bayou
Securities, a stock-trading subsidiary that racked up heavy commissions from Israel's
frenetic trading"). One example of their misrepresentations is documented in the funds'
2003 annual statement, in which the defendants reported "that Bayou Superfund had earned
more than $25 million." Israel Complaint, supra note 1, at 8. In reality, "Bayou Superfund
took in more than $90 million in investments [in 2003], but lost approximately $35 million
through trading." Id.
4. Israel Complaint, supra note 1, at 6.
5. Id. Marino was a certified public accountant. Id.
6. Id. at 7 ("In the summaries and year-end financial statements, Israel and Marino
again fabricated the [f]und's results in order to make it appear that the [f]und was earning
trading profits and achieving earnings targets that the defendants had formulated to create
the appearance of modest, steady, and believable growth.").
7. Id. at 5.
8. Id. at 7.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 8.
11. Id. at9.
12. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). "Despite the patently dubious nature of the
trading programs to which he was being steered, Israel pursued them using monies taken
from the [flunds." Id.
13. Id. at 13.
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receive ninety percent of their investments the following week and the
remaining ten percent by the end of the month."'1 4  However, the
redemption checks sent to investors were returned for insufficient funds,
and most investors were unable to retrieve their money. 15
The story of the Bayou funds is just one of the many examples of how
investors are harmed by the fraud committed by hedge fund advisers.
Issues relating to the magnitude of these frauds and how best to protect
investors remain unsettled and controversial. One of the most significant
hurdles faced by these victims of fraud is producing sufficient evidence to
support their claims. The San Diego County Employees Retirement
Association (SDCERA) is currently grappling with this issue in its lawsuit
against Amaranth Advisers LLC.16
In 2005, SDCERA invested $175 million with Amaranth Advisers
LLC. 17 Amaranth was a Greenwich, Connecticut-based hedge fund that
once managed over $9 billion in assets.18 SDCERA is currently in the
midst of litigation resulting from Amaranth's collapse after the hedge fund
sustained $6.6 billion in natural gas trading losses in September 2006.19
The complaint, filed by SDCERA in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York, accuses Amaranth of "defrauding clients by
misrepresenting itself as a fund that invested in many different assets." 20
The complaint claims that "' [t]he fund, against its own espoused investment
policies, effectively operated as a single-strategy natural-gas fund that took
very large and highly leveraged gambles and recklessly failed to apply even
basic risk-management techniques and controls. " 21
Although SDCERA hopes to prevail at trial, it faces a long process with a
heavy burden of proof.22 Nonetheless, the failure of the fund has left San
Diego County employees with "jitters and some panic." 23 According to
14. Id.
15. Id. ("Documents obtained from Bayou-related bank accounts show that the accounts
were overdrawn before the liquidation and redemption checks were drafted.").
16. See Complaint, San Diego County Employees Ret. Ass'n v. Maounis, No. 07 civ.
2618 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2007) [hereinafter SDCERA Complaint].
17. Jenny Strasburg, Amaranth Sued by San Diego, Warns of Refund Delays,
BLOOMBERG, Mar. 30, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=al
2cSn2AKd5Y&refer=home. New Jersey's pension fund, another Amaranth investor, may
"lose $16 million of its $25 million it [originally] invested with Amaranth." Amaranth Fund
Details Losses to Investors: Lost $6 billion, Had to Sell Assets to Cover Bad Natural Gas
Investments, MSNBC, Sept. 21, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14927007/.
18. See Strasburg, supra note 17 ("Amaranth's assets peaked at $9.5 billion in August as
rising prices increased the value of its holdings.").
19. Id. The complaint seeks damages of at least $150 million based on the retirement
plan's initial investment. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. (quoting SDCERA Complaint, supra note 16, at 2).
22. Id. ("Investors 'must show that the firm engaged in fraud and malfeasance, with
direct evidence establishing more than just that someone could have done a better job with a
risky investment."' (quoting Seth Berenzweig, a lawyer with Virginia-based Albo & Oblon
LLP)).
23. Josh Gerstein, Lawyers Circle After Failure of Hedge Fund, N.Y. SuN, Oct. 20-22,
2006, at Al.
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Dorothy Sloter, the head of SDCERA, the employees are "very
concerned.... about their retirement, and the security of their pensions. '24
The collapse of Bayou and Amaranth illustrate how fraud and
mismanagement of hedge funds can significantly harm investors. Cases
such as these have fueled discussions over the need for additional
regulatory oversight and protection for investors from fraud. Fraud is
defined as a "knowing misrepresentation of the truth or concealment of a
material fact."'25 Fraud is therefore an intentional deception, making it
inherently difficult to discover, even through regular SEC inspections. 26
Although the exact number of hedge funds is hard to quantify, it is clear
that hedge funds are continually growing in "size, scope and influence. ' 27
In 2006, the number of hedge funds grew by 10%, and there are currently
about 9000.28 Hedge funds are estimated to "account for 20% to 50% of
the daily trading volume on the New York Stock Exchange. '29 The "total
assets under management by hedge funds have reached approximately $2
trillion and assets under management are expected to grow at an annualized
rate of 15% between 2005 and 2008."30
Traditionally, investors in hedge funds were not thought to need the full
protections of federal securities laws and regulations. 3 1 Hedge funds were
considered "private and largely unregulated investment pools for the
rich."'32 However, over time, inflation has lowered the wealth threshold to
buy into these funds, making them more accessible to many unsophisticated
investors. Additionally, much of the growth of the hedge fund industry
24. Id.
25. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 685 (8th ed. 2004).
26. See Role of Hedge Funds in the Capital Markets: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Securities, Insurance, and Investment of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, 109th Cong. 4 (2006) [hereinafter Hedge Fund Hearing] (statement of Patrick M.
Parkinson, Deputy Director, Division of Research and Statistics, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System). "For example, three Federal Reserve examinations of the New
York branch of Daiwa Bank between 1992 and 1994 failed to uncover $1.1 billion of hidden
trading losses." Id. at 4 n. 10.
27. Michael Pereira, Hedge Fund Taxation, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., Sept. 2007,
at 13, available at http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2007/September/l 3.pdf.
28. Id. These figures were reported in September of 2007. Id.
29. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Hedge Fund Information for Investors,
www.fbi.gov/page2/marchO7/hedge-fund.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2008).
30. Id.
31. See Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 875 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ("Investment vehicles that
remain private and available only to highly sophisticated investors have historically been
understood not to present the same dangers to public markets as more widely available
investment companies, like mutual funds."); see also Federal Bureau of Investigation, supra
note 29 ("The theory behind their creation was that high-wealth investors are 'financially
sophisticated' and therefore did not need or want to incur the additional administrative
expense of reporting to a regulatory agency.").
32. ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-TERM
CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 24 (2000).
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"can be attributed to the investments of institutional investors. '33  An
increasing number of institutional investors such as public and private
pension funds, university endowments, charitable organizations, and
foundations are investing a significant portion of their money in hedge
funds.34 Hedge funds have also become accessible to small investors who
are now able to invest through broker firms that package hedge funds into
"funds of hedge funds."'35
The growth in the number of hedge funds and the value of assets under
their management, combined with the "retailization" of the industry, has led
to concern over whether investors are adequately protected from the
corresponding growth in hedge fund fraud. 36 In the past, the SEC was able
to use various securities laws to enforce fraud actions against hedge funds.
However, this enforcement power was questioned by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Goldstein v. SEC.37 The
SEC responded to the resulting uncertainty by creating a new antifraud
provision aimed at prohibiting advisers to pooled investment vehicles from
defrauding investors in the investment vehicles they advise. 38
Part I of this Note traces the history of hedge fund regulation and the
industry in general. Part II assesses the most recent SEC antifraud rule
relating to hedge funds. Part II also discusses alternatives to SEC
regulation proposed to protect investors from fraud within the hedge fund
industry. Part III argues that the current SEC rule will not effectively
protect investors or deter fraud within hedge funds. Part III then proposes
33. STAFF, SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS 43
(2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds09O3.pdf [hereinafter
STAFF REPORT ON THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS].
34. Investor Protection and the Regulation of the Hedge Funds Advisers: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 5-6 (2004)
(statement of William H. Donaldson, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission).
Best industry estimates indicate "that pensions' investments in hedge funds have increased
from $13 billion in 1997 to more than $72 billion so far in 2004, an increase of more than
450 percent." Id. at 6.
35. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Hedging Your Bets: A Heads Up on
Hedge Funds and Funds of Hedge Funds, http://www.sec.gov/answers/hedge.htm (last
visited Oct. 24, 2008). "A fund of hedge funds is an investment company that invests in
hedge funds-rather than investing in individual securities." Id. "Many registered funds of
hedge funds have much lower investment minimums (e.g., $25,000) than individual hedge
funds. Thus, some investors that would be unable to invest in a hedge fund directly may be
able to purchase shares of registered funds of hedge funds." Id.
36. Investor Protection and the Regulation of the Hedge Funds Advisers: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 8-9 (2004)
(testimony of William H. Donaldson, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission). The "retailization" of hedge funds refers to "the increasing ability of less
qualified (or retail) investors to access hedge fund investments." Franklin R. Edwards,
Hedge Funds and Investor Protection Regulation 15-16 (May 16, 2006) (unpublished
conference paper), available at http://www.frbatlanta.org/news/conferen/06fmc/06fmc-
edwards.pdf.
37. Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 874-77 (D.C. Cir. 2006); see infra Part I.C.1.
38. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-8 (2008); Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled
Investment Vehicles, Investment Advisers Act Release No. IA-2628, 72 Fed. Reg. 44,756,
44,756 (Aug. 9, 2007) [hereinafter SEC Release: Antifraud Rule].
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that investors will be better protected by creating a self-regulatory
organization for hedge funds.
I. HEDGE FUNDS AND THE SEC
This part explores the history of hedge funds and their rapid growth that
attracted increased attention regarding the role of the SEC in protecting
hedge fund investors from fraud committed by their advisers. Part I.A
defines hedge funds and details how they have historically escaped
regulation under the federal securities laws. Part II.B explains how the
expansion of the hedge fund industry and the near-collapse of Long-Term
Capital Management led the SEC to investigate and enact a new "hedge
fund rule" requiring hedge fund advisers to register with the Commission.
Part I.C discusses the D.C. Circuit Court's decision to vacate this rule and
how the SEC responded by enacting a new antifraud provision to protect
investors in hedge funds from fraud. Finally, Part I.D discusses
government and industry responses to these events and the role of self-
regulatory organizations within the federal securities laws.
A. Hedge Fund History and Regulation
In the early 1990s, more Americans owned investments than ever before,
and stock prices were "rising to astonishing heights." 39 As a result, "no
fewer than 6 million people around the world counted themselves as dollar
millionaires, with a total of $17 trillion in assets." 40 With this increased
number of wealthy investors came an increased interest in investing in
hedge funds. Part I.A. 1 discusses the nature of hedge funds while Part
I.A.2 discusses how hedge funds have dodged regulation by the
Commission under the federal securities laws.
1. Defining "Hedge Funds"
Hedge funds are "notoriously difficult to define." 41 The term "hedge
fund" is not mentioned anywhere in the federal securities laws, and even
within the industry, there is no single, agreed upon definition.42 The term is
commonly used as a catchall to encompass "any pooled investment vehicle
that is privately organized, administered by professional investment
39. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 32, at 23.
40. Id. (citing Franklin R. Edwards, Hedge Funds and the Collapse of Long-Term
Capital Management, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1999, at 189, 193).
41. Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 874.
42. Id. at 874-75; see also STAFF REPORT ON THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS, supra note
33, at viii ("The term generally identifies an entity that holds a pool of securities and perhaps
other assets that does not register its securities offerings under the Securities Act and which
is not registered as an investment company under the Investment Company Act."); David A.
Vaughn, Dechert LLP, Comments for the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
Roundtable on Hedge Funds (May 13, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/hedgefunds/
hedge-vaughn.htm (providing fourteen different definitions found in government and
industry publications).
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managers, and not widely available to the public." 43 Hedge funds generally
pool capital from investors and invest those funds in securities and other
financial instruments in an effort to "limit risk and volatility while
providing positive returns under all market conditions." 44
a. Structure of Hedge Funds.
Most hedge funds are structured as limited partnerships to benefit
investors who are subject to U.S. taxation.45 They may also be organized as
limited liability companies or business trusts. 46 A hedge fund organized as
a limited partnership has a general partner (also commonly referred to as the
fund manager or fund adviser), often itself a limited liability company or
other entity, which manages the fund (or several funds) and numerous
limited partners who are relatively passive investors. 47 The fund manager
is given "broad investment discretion in selecting investments and trading
for the fund."'48 The day-to-day operations of the partnership are usually
governed by an Agreement of Limited Partnership.49
As discussed below, hedge funds do not typically offer securities to the
public. Instead, "[h]edge funds distribute securities in private offerings,
traditionally 'marketing' their interests through word of mouth and the
personal relationships with the hedge fund's advisory personnel."50
43. Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 875 (quoting PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS.,
HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 1
(1999) [hereinafter LESSONS OF LTCM], available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/
reports/hedgfund.pdf).
44. THOMAS P. LEMKE ET AL., HEDGE FUNDS AND OTHER PRIVATE FUNDS: REGULATION
AND COMPLIANCE § 1.1, at 1-2 (2004-2005 ed. 2004).
45. Id. § 2.8, at 14.
46. STAFF REPORT ON THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS, supra note 33, at 9 n.27. Each of
these formations are beneficial to the investors because they "are generally not separately
taxed and, as a result, income is taxed only at the level of the individual investor." Id. Other
benefits of these forms of organization include limiting the liability of an investor to the
extent of its investment in the fund and providing the general partner with broad authority
with respect to management. Id.
47. LEMKE ET AL., supra note 44, § 2.8, at 14. The general partner is responsible for the
general management of the fund, which includes selection of which investments to add to the
fund's portfolio, management of the assets and a number of other activities for the fund. Id. §
2.2, at 10. With the exception of the general partner, all investors are limited partners, who
"share in the partnership's income, expenses, gains and losses based on the balances in their
respective capital accounts, but do not exercise any day-to-day management or control over
the partnership." Id. § 2.8, at 14.
48. Id. § 2.2, at 10.
49. Id. § 2.8, at 15. The Agreement of Limited Partnership usually sets forth important
aspects of operating the fund, including, but not limited to, who is responsible for managing
the fund, the powers of the general partner, the object or purpose of the partnership,
indemnification, the management fees and performance allocations and valuation of
portfolio assets. Id. § 2.8, at 15-16.




One common characteristic among hedge funds is their fee structure.
Fund advisers or managers are typically compensated with a base
management fee (usually a percentage, commonly one to two percent, of
the fund's assets). 51  In addition to this base fee, there is typically a
performance component to their compensation, which is usually a
percentage of the increase in the fund's value (e.g., twenty percent of
positive return). 52 Managers commonly make significant direct investments
in the funds they manage. 53 The performance component of a manger's
compensation, along with their personal investment, tends to create a strong
alignment of interests between the outside investors in the hedge fund and
the manager. 54
c. Relationships with Investors and Disclosure
Hedge funds are generally not required to make extensive disclosures to
investors or regulators. 55 Therefore, "limits or restrictions on hedge funds'
activities are determined not by regulation but primarily by the contractual
relationships they have with their investors and by market discipline exerted
by the creditors, counterparties, and investors with whom they transact." 56
Investors typically receive information from hedge fund advisers "during an
investor's initial due diligence review of the fund, although some, more
proprietary information may not be provided until after the investor has
made a capital commitment to the fund, if at all."'57
The relationship between the fund manager and the investors is usually
governed by an Agreement of Limited Partnership. 58 Although hedge funds
typically are not legally required to provide disclosure to investors, many
"unregistered and unregulated hedge funds make some disclosures in the
form of private placement memorand[a], conference calls, informal
conversations, and other unofficial devices." 59 In addition, some hedge
funds use other legal documents to cover the relationship between investors
51. LEMKE ET AL., supra note 44, § 1.1, at 2; STAFF REPORT ON THE GROWTH OF HEDGE
FUNDS, supra note 33, at ix.
52. LEMKE ET AL., supra note 44, § 1.1, at 2.
53. MANAGED FUNDS ASSN, SOUND PRACTICES FOR HEDGE FUND MANAGERS intro., at 8
(2007) [hereinafter SOUND PRACTICES], available at http://www.managedfunds.org/
downloads/Sound%20Practices%202007.pdf. This investment approach "can be particularly
important in attracting outside investors since it aligns the fund manager's interests with
those of outside investors and exposes the fund manager to the same investment risks."
LEMKE ET AL., supra note 44, § 1.1, at 2.
54. SOUND PRACTICES, supra note 53, intro., at 8.
55. Edwards, supra note 36, at 10.
56. Id.
57. STAFF REPORT ON THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS, supra note 33, at 46.
58. SOUND PRACTICES, supra note 53, intro., at 9.
59. Daniel K. Liffmann, Registration of Hedge Fund Advisers Under the Investment
Advisers Act, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 2147, 2159 (2005).
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and managers, including offering memoranda, subscription agreements, or
similar contracts. 60
Given the structure of most hedge funds, it is generally understood that
the client of the manager is the hedge fund itself-not the individual
investors.61 Even though the manager may, and often does, interact with
the investors, the manager is viewed as providing "its investment advice to
the Hedge Fund in accordance with the investment strategy and objectives
set forth in the Hedge Fund's offering documents, rather than any specific
objectives or directives of any individual Hedge Fund investor. '62
In order to invest in a hedge fund, investors are required to meet certain
standards, such as net worth or other financial sophistication
requirements. 63 U.S. securities laws require that hedge fund investors,
whether institutional or individual, satisfy the specified eligibility
requirements based on their wealth and sophistication because investment
in the funds is not available to the public. 64 In addition to these restrictions,
"managers of certain institutional investors, such as pension fund plans, are
fiduciaries with a legal duty to act in the best interest of plan beneficiaries
when making any investments on behalf of the institution. '65
d. Investment Goals and Strategies
In the current financial market, the term "hedge fund" has been
understood to describe a "wide range of investment vehicles that can vary
substantially in terms of size, strategy, business model, and organizational
structure." 66 The first hedge funds "invested in equities and used leverage
and short selling to 'hedge' the portfolio's exposure to movements of the
corporate equity markets." 67 However, since hedge funds are not generally
restrained or restricted by diversification requirements, they began to
diversify their investment portfolios and engage in a wider variety of
investment strategies. 68 Hedge funds today trade not only equities, but also
"fixed income securities, convertible securities, currencies, exchange-traded
futures, over-the-counter derivatives, futures contracts, commodity options
60. SOUND PRACTICES, supra note 53, intro., at 9.
61. Id. intro., at 8. Although a manager's client is considered the hedge fund itself, the
manager often communicates with the investors about matters related to the fund, including
"its investment objectives, strategies, terms, and conditions of an investment in the hedge
fund." Id. intro., at 9.
62. Id. intro., at 8.
63. Id. intro., at 9; see infra Part I.A.2.
64. SOUND PRACTICES, supra note 53, intro., at 9.
65. Id.
66. Id. intro., at 7.
67. STAFF REPORT ON THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS, supra note 33, at 3 (discussing
Alfred Winslow Jones, who "is credited with establishing one of the first hedge funds as a
private partnership in 1949"). Hedge funds "may obtain leverage by purchasing securities
on margin, selling short, obtaining funding from banks or other sources, engaging in
repurchase agreements, or using various derivative or synthetic instruments." LEMKE ET AL.,
supra note 44, § 1.1, at 1-2.
68. STAFF REPORT ON THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS, supra note 33, at 3.
2008]
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and other non-securities investments." 69 Also, hedge funds today are not
tied to utilizing the hedging and arbitrage strategies that hedge funds
historically employed, and now many engage in relatively traditional long-
only equity strategies. 70
Hedge funds seek to achieve positive, absolute investment returns under
all market conditions, often with less volatility and risk than traditional
asset classes such as stocks and bonds.7' The funds typically engage in
many different investment strategies to achieve their investment goals,
including investment in "distressed securities, illiquid securities, securities
of companies in emerging markets and derivatives, as well as pursue
arbitrage opportunities, such as those arising from possible mergers or
acquisitions." 72 Managers of hedge funds are known to "employ more
complicated, flexible investment strategies than advisers at mutual funds
[and] brokerage firms." 73
e. Benefits of Hedge Funds
Hedge funds in many respects tend to foster financial stability and
provide benefits to financial markets. 74 Some of the important benefits that
hedge funds offer to capital markets include "'liquidity, price efficiency and
risk distribution.' 75  For example, "many hedge funds take speculative,
value-driven trading positions based on extensive research about the value
of a security." Funds that take such positions can enhance liquidity and
contribute to market efficiency. 76 Also, "hedge funds offer investors an
important risk management tool by providing valuable portfolio
diversification because hedge fund returns in many cases are not correlated
to the broader debt and equity markets." 77 However, there are increasing
concerns expressed by policy makers with respect to certain activities of
hedge funds and the potential for systematic risk. In particular, regulatory
supervisors have taken interest in over-the-counter derivatives, expressing
69. Id.
70. Id. at 3-4. Long-only investment strategy is when a fund "purchases and sells
securities, but does not sell securities short to a significant extent." LEMKE ET AL., supra note
44, § 1.2, at 2.
71. See LEMKE ET AL., supra note 44, § 1.1, at 1-2; STAFF REPORT ON THE GROWTH OF
HEDGE FUNDS, supra note 33, at 4.
72. STAFF REPORT ON THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS, supra note 33, at 4.
73. Id.
74. Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk: Perspectives of the President's Working Group on
Financial Markets: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Financial Servs., 110th Cong. 5
(2007) (statement of Kevin Warsh, Member, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System); STAFF REPORT ON THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS, supra note 33, at 4.
75. Comment Letter from John G. Gaine, President, Managed Funds Ass'n, to Nancy M.
Morris, Sec'y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n 2 (Mar. 9, 2007) [hereinafter MFA Letter],
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-25-06/s72506-567.pdf (quoting Regulation of
Hedge Funds: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
109th Cong. 2 (2006) (statement of Randal K. Quarles, Under Secretary for Domestic
Finance, U.S. Department of the Treasury)).
76. STAFF REPORT ON THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS, supra note 33, at viii.
77. Id.
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their "concern that a major credit event could have a substantial impact on
global financial markets." 78
2. The Regulation of Hedge Funds and Their Advisers
In the United States, hedge funds are neither authorized nor restricted by
the government; nor does the government mandate that hedge funds and
their advisers make specific disclosures to investors.79 The United States
does not have a strict comprehensive system to regulate hedge funds;
instead, "[i]n the United States the regulation of hedge funds might be best
characterized as a patchwork of exemptions from various investor-
protection laws."' 80 Hedge funds are investment pools with substantial
investments in securities, whose activities could potentially subject them to
legal restrictions and regulations. Therefore, most funds operate themselves
in such a manner that exempts them from regulation under the four major
U.S. securities laws that could potentially affect them-the Securities Act
of 1933 (Securities Act),8 ' the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange
Act), 82 the Investment Company Act of 1940 (Company Act),83 and the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (Advisers Act).84 Hedge funds escape
registration under these Acts through certain exclusions or exemptions,
which include limiting availability only to certain sophisticated or
accredited investors and not offering or selling interest or shares to the
general public. 85
The Company Act restricts registered investment companies to the types
of transactions they may undertake. 86 The Act charges the Commission
with regulation of any issuer of securities that "is or holds itself out as being
engaged primarily ... in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in
securities." 87  Since most hedge funds have substantial investments in
securities, they fall within the definition of an investment company under
the Act. However, most hedge funds avoid regulation by fitting into one of
78. SOUND PRACTICES, supra note 53, intro., at 4-5.
79. Edwards, supra note 36, at 7.
80. Id.
81. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2006). The Securities Act seeks to "provide full and fair
disclosure in securities transactions." STAFF REPORT ON THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS,
supra note 33, at 13. The Act generally "requires issuers to register a security with the SEC
before it is offered to the public." Jennifer Ralph Oppold, The Changing Landscape of
Hedge Fund Regulation: Current Concerns and a Principle-Based Approach, 10 U. PA. J.
Bus. & EMP. L. 833, 843 (2008). Hedge funds typically escape regulation under the
Securities Act by obtaining their "investors through private placements rather than a public
offering," which requires that they meet "the requirements of section 4(2) or Regulation D"
of the Securities Act, and "usually means restricting their investors to 'accredited'
investors." Edwards, supra note 36, at 8.
82. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78111. For a discussion of the Exchange Act and how it regulates
hedge funds, see Oppold, supra note 81, at 845-46.
83. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64.
84. Id. §§ 80b-I to-21.
85. LEMKE ET AL., supra note 44, § 1.1, at 1-2.
86. Id.
87. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1)(A).
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two statutory exclusions to the definition of an investment company. 88
Section 3(c)(1) excludes an entity from the definition if the outstanding
securities are "beneficially owned by not more than 100 persons" and if the
entity does not presently or in the future plan to offer its securities to the
public. 89 The second provision that hedge funds typically rely on is section
3(c)(7). Under this section, a fund is not considered an investment
company if outstanding securities are owned exclusively by "qualified
purchasers" and its securities are not offered to the public.90
Since most hedge funds are not regulated by the Company Act, they have
greater flexibility in their investment strategies than the investment vehicles
defined as investment companies, such as mutual funds.91 Because of their
exemption, hedge funds can remain secretive about their positions and
strategies, while mutual funds are required to "disclose their investment
positions and financial condition." 92  Also, mutual funds and other
registered investment companies face significant restrictions on permissible
transactions. 93 Freedom from these constraints allows hedge funds to trade
in a much greater variety of assets, "from traditional stocks, bonds, and
currencies to more exotic financial derivatives and even non-financial
assets."
94
The Advisers Act is mainly a registration and antifraud statute that
regulates most investment advisers by imposing registration and disclosure
88. STAFF REPORT ON THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS, supra note 33, at 11. Sections 3
and 4 of the Securities Act exempt certain securities and transactions from the registration
requirements. ARNOLD S. JACOBS, 5 DISCLOSURE AND REMEDIES UNDER THE SECURITIES LAW
§ 3.3 n.3 (2008). Section 3(a) exempts specific securities. Id. "In addition to the exemptions
provided by statute under Section 3(a), Sections 3(b) and 3(c) permit the SEC to promulgate
rules and regulations adding other exempt classes of securities." Id.
89. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1). Funds that rely on section 3(c)(1) must "comply with
Section 4(2) of the Securities Act, and frequently do so by relying on the safe harbor
available under Regulation D under that Act." STAFF REPORT ON THE GROWTH OF HEDGE
FUNDS, supra note 33, at 12. Reliance on Regulation D requires that hedge funds "offer their
securities only to 'accredited investors,' and [that they] not engage in any general solicitation
or general advertising of their shares." Id. Accredited investors include "individuals with a
minimum annual income of $200,000 ($300,000 with spouse) or $1 million in net worth and
most institutions with $5 million in assets." Id.
90. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7)(A). Under section 2(a)(51) of the Company Act, a
"qualified purchaser" means "any natural person ... who owns not less than $5,000,000 in
investments" or "any person, acting for its own account or the accounts of other qualified
purchasers, who in the aggregate owns and invests on a discretionary basis, not less than
$25,000,000 in investments." Id. § 80a-2(a)(5 l)(i), (iv).
91. Federal Bureau of Investigation, supra note 29 ("Hedge funds can invest in equities,
bonds, options, futures, commodities, arbitrage and derivative contracts, as well as illiquid
investments such as real estate.").
92. Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 875 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
93. Id. For example, registered investment companies are "foreclosed from trading on
margin or engaging in short sales and must secure shareholder approval to take on significant
debt or invest in certain types of assets, such as real estate or commodities." Id. (citing 15
U.S.C. §§ 80a- I 2(a)(1), (a)(3), 80a- 1 3(a)(2)).
94. Id. at 876.
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requirements, as well as substantive regulatory requirements on them.95
Hedge fund advisers generally satisfy the definition of an "investment
adviser" under the Advisers Act.96 However, advisers to hedge funds may
avoid registering with the Commission if they satisfy the elements of the
exemption under section 203(b) of the Act. An adviser may rely on the
"private adviser exemption" of section 203(b)(3) if the following conditions
are met: (1) the investment adviser has had "fewer than fifteen clients" in
the preceding twelve months; (2) the adviser does not hold "himself out
generally to the public as an investment adviser"; and (3) the adviser does
not act "as an investment adviser to any investment company registered
under [the Company Act]."'97  Although many hedge funds are not
registered under the Company Act, and their managers are exempt from
registration under the Advisers Act, they are still subject to the antifraud
provisions of the federal securities laws.98
For the purposes of section 203(b), the Commission rules provided that a
"legal organization," such as a hedge fund, would be counted as a single
"client." 99 Since even the largest hedge fund managers do not run fifteen
hedge funds, this provision provides an exemption for most hedge fund
managers. 100
95. LEMKE ET AL., supra note 44, § 3.1, at 25; see also Registration Under the Advisers
Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No. IA-2333, 69
Fed. Reg. 72,054, 72,054 (Dec. 10, 2004) [hereinafter SEC Release: Hedge Fund Rule]
("The Act contains a few basic requirements, such as registration with the Commission,
maintenance of certain business records, and delivery to clients of a disclosure statement
('brochure').").
96. STAFF REPORT ON THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS, supra note 33, at 20. Section
202(a)(1 1) of the Advisers Act generally defines an "investment adviser" as one who "for
compensation, engages in the business of advising others, either directly or through
publications or writings, as to the value of securities or as to the advisability of investing in,
purchasing, or selling securities." 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(1 1).
97. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3).
98. SEC Release: Hedge Fund Rule, supra note 95, at 72,054. Although advisers who
take advantage of the "private adviser exemption" must comply with the Act's antifraud
provisions, they "do not file registration forms with [the SEC] identifying who they are, do
not have to maintain business records in accordance with [SEC] rules, do not have to adopt
or implement compliance programs or codes of ethics, and are not subject to Commission
oversight." Id. These exempt advisers "are also subject to antifraud provisions of other
federal securities laws, including rule 1Ob-5" under the Exchange Act. Id. at 72,054 n.6.
99. Id. at 72,055 n.10. "Rule 203(b)(3)-1 under the Advisers Act provides that an
adviser may count a legal organization as a single client if the legal organization receives
investment advice based on its investment objectives rather than on the individual
investment objectives of its owners." STAFF REPORT ON THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS,
supra note 33, at 21 n.72.
100. Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 876 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Some hedge fund managers
do register as an investment adviser because they do not meet the requirements of section
203(b), or they register "voluntarily because their investors demand it or for competitive
reasons." STAFF REPORT ON THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS, supra note 33, at 22.
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B. Long-Term Capital and the SEC's Response
This section discusses the SEC's growing interest and concern that led to
its attempt to increase regulation of hedge funds. Part I.B. 1 discusses the
near failure of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) and how this
event prompted the SEC to commence an investigation into the hedge fund
industry. Part I.B.2 summarizes the relevant findings reported by the SEC's
staff that led the Commission to adopt a new rule aimed at regulating hedge
funds. Part I.B.3 then sets forth the SEC's "Hedge Fund Rule" and how the
Commission believed this would help deter or detect fraud committed by
unregistered hedge fund advisers.
1. The Near Failure of LTCM
LTCM was a Greenwich, Connecticut-based fund that, at its peak, held
over $125 billion in assets under management. 10 LTCM was a bond-
trading firm run by John W. Meriwether, a former well-known trader at
Salomon Brothers, and comprised of "a group of brainy, Ph.D.-certified
arbitrageurs," many of whom were professors and two of whom had won
the Nobel Prize. 102 Due to Meriwether's popularity among the bankers, he
was able to obtain financing from every major Wall Street bank on highly
generous terms.10 3 LTCM became the envy of Wall Street. For over four
years, "[t]he fund had racked up returns of more than 40 percent a year,
with no losing stretches, no volatility, seemingly no risk at all."' 1 4  It
seemed that this incredibly smart group of men had "been able to reduce an
uncertain world to rigorous, cold-blooded odds."'10 5
In mid-August of 1998, Russia defaulted on its ruble debt which caused
the global bond markets to be highly unsettled. 10 6 This left LTCM on the
brink of failure. However, in addition to its bond trading, LTCM had
entered into thousands of derivative contracts that had intertwined the fund
with every bank on Wall Street, and "[a]lmost all of the country's major
financial institutions were put at risk due to their credit exposure to Long-
Term."'1 7 William J. McDonough, the president of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, feared that, if LTCM failed, "the markets would stop
working; that trading would cease; that the system itself would come
101. Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 877. For a complete account of the story of Long-Term
Capital Management (LTCM), see LOWENSTEIN, supra note 32.
102. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 32, at xix.
103. Id. LTCM had amassed $100 billion in assets, virtually all of it borrowed from the
major Wall Street banks. Id. The fund had also "entered into thousands of derivative
contracts, which had endlessly intertwined it with every bank on Wall Street." Id. These
derivative contracts were essentially side bets on market prices and they created more than
$1 trillion worth of exposure. Id. If LTCM defaulted on these contracts, these banks "would
be exposed to tremendous-and untenable-risks." Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at xx.
107. Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 877 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
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crashing down."10 8 McDonough personally intervened by summoning the
heads of every major Wall Street bank to engineer a bailout of the fund and
avoid a national financial crisis.' 0 9  Although the Commission had
previously been interested in regulating hedge funds, the failure of LTCM
led the Commission to explore ways to increase the regulation of hedge
funds. I 10
2. The SEC Investigation of Hedge Funds
Beginning in June 2002, the SEC Staff of the Commission's Division of
Investment Management and Office of Compliance Inspections and
Examinations conducted a study aimed at reviewing the operations and
practices of hedge funds."' When the study was complete, the
Commission held a two-day roundtable on the hedge fund industry. 112
After the Hedge Fund Roundtable, Chairman William H. Donaldson asked
the staff to compile a summary report (Staff Report) of its findings and
recommendations. 113  Based on the investigation and report, the
Commission decided that a new rule was necessary to detect fraud in hedge
funds in its early stages. 114
The study was largely the result of concern over the lack of information
available to the Commission "about hedge fund advisers that are not
registered under the Advisers Act and the hedge funds that they
manage.""15 Since hedge funds are generally not registered with the SEC,
"they are not subject to any reporting or standardized disclosure
requirements, nor are they subject to Commission examination." 116 The
Staff Report concluded that SEC efforts to detect hedge fund fraud at early
stages were unsuccessful due to an inability to obtain information. 117
As previously mentioned, even hedge funds that are not registered under
the Company Act and their advisers who are not registered under the
Advisers Act are subject to the antifraud provisions of the federal securities
laws. 118 At the time of the investigation, the Commission had brought
approximately thirty-eight enforcement actions since 1999 involving hedge
108. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 32, at xix-xx.
109. Id. at xviii.
110. Id.
111. STAFF REPORT ON THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS, supra note 33, at 2.
112. Id. at vii.
113. Id. at vii-viii.
114. See id. at x.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. This Note focuses only on the fraud aspects of the Staff Report, but the report
also addresses concern over the increasing participation of hedge funds in financial markets,
whether they are a danger to the stability of the U.S. financial markets and whether they
subject investors to inordinately high levels of risk.
118. Id.
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fund fraud-fraud that resulted in significant losses to investors.1 19 Also at
the time of the Staff Report, the Commission was seeing a steady increase
in the number of fraud enforcement actions; however, it found that "[t]here
was no evidence indicating that hedge funds or their advisers engage
disproportionately in fraudulent activity."' 20
The investigation found that the fraud charges previously brought by the
Commission against hedge fund advisers were "similar to the types of fraud
charged against other types of investment advisers."' 21 These include:
"misappropriation of assets; misrepresentation of portfolio performance;
falsification of experience, credentials and past retums; misleading
disclosure regarding claimed trading strategies; and improper valuation of
assets." 122  It found that "[t]he overwhelming majority of the cases the
Commission has instituted involve charges under.., the Securities Act, the
Exchange Act and the Investment Advisers Act." 123
The report provided four observations with regard to the hedge fund
enforcement actions brought by the Commission since 1999. First, it noted
that "[n]early a third of the hedge fund cases brought in the last four years
involved criminal charges."'124 Also, the staff noted that one characteristic
that seems common to hedge fund cases is how far violators will go to
conceal their fraud.' 25  The staff found that "[i]n almost half of the
enforcement actions brought since 1999, the defendants or respondents
created false documentation in an effort to hide their fraud."'1 26 Another
characteristic "that is perhaps more common to hedge fund cases than the
typical investment adviser's case is the greater frequency of outright theft,
or misappropriation, of investor funds." 127 Lastly, the staff reported that
"both registered and unregistered investment advisers have engaged in
hedge fund fraud."' 28
Typically the Commission identifies frauds and other misconduct
involving hedge funds only after they are contacted by "fund investors or
service providers [who] suspect fraudulent activity."' 129 This translates to
119. Id. at 73. "In most cases involving hedge funds, the Commission institutes
enforcement actions against the hedge fund adviser and/or the adviser's principals." Id. at 73
n.252.
120. Id. at 73. The staff listed several factors that may be linked to the increase in the
number of hedge fund fraud cases, including "the popularity of hedge fund investments and
the large amounts of money they involve (and thus their attractiveness to perpetrators of
fraud); the entrance to the industry of inexperienced, untested and, in some cases,
unqualified individuals; and lack of adequate controls on the operations of some hedge fund
advisers." Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 73-74 (footnotes omitted).
123. Id. at 74.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. ("These documents included account statements and other types of reports to
customers, confirmations and pricing sheets.").
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 76.
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the Commission "instituting enforcement action against an unregistered
hedge fund adviser only after significant losses have occurred."'130 In
contrast, the Staff Report found that "the Commission has an advantage in
identifying the misconduct of registered investment advisers because they
are subject to periodic examinations by Commission staff."' 131 Therefore,
the report suggested that when registered investment advisers partake in
fraudulent or other unlawful activity, their examinations could lead to
earlier discovery that could potentially prevent significant losses.132 Also,
they suggested that the Commission's "potential for a surprise examination
and deficiency letters to encourage a culture of compliance at regulated
entities" would serve to deter fraud and other misconduct. 133
3. The Hedge Fund Rule
After completing its study of the hedge fund industry in 2003, the SEC
issued a new rule over the dissent of two of the five SEC commissioners in
December 2004.134 Rule 203(b)(3)-2 (the Hedge Fund Rule) required that
investment advisers "count each owner of a 'private fund"' as a client,
which included "each shareholder, limited partner, member, or beneficiary
of the 'private fund.""' 135 Therefore, it required fund advisers to register
under the Advisers Act so that the Commission could gather "'basic
information about hedge fund advisers and the hedge fund industry,"'
"'oversee hedge fund advisers," and "deter or detect fraud by unregistered
hedge fund advisers.""' 136 The rule sought "to increase disclosure in an
industry with little transparency and to oversee an allegedly growing pool
of assets." 137
130. Id.
131. Id. Although the Staff Report indicated that registration provides the SEC with an
advantage, others argue that there is no evidence that periodic examinations of registered
companies aid in preventing fraud. See, e.g., Hedge Fund Hearing, supra note 26; Jenny
Anderson, A Modest Proposal to Prevent Hedge Fund Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2005, at
C6 ("The commission is not adequately staffed or technologically equipped to effectively
regulate the markets today. Adding 5,000 hedge funds to its to-do list is a dangerous
undertaking. While it is desirable to have a watchdog, there is no way the staff of the S.E.C.
can do it well .... ). When expressing his opposition to hedge fund regulation,
Commissioner Paul S. Atkins argued that "the commission did not have the resources to
police the mutual fund industry-one chock-full of small investors-so taking on the hedge
fund industry was an exercise in futility." Anderson, supra.
132. STAFF REPORT ON THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS, supra note 33, at 76.
133. Id. at 76-77.
134. SEC Release: Hedge Fund Rule, supra note 95, at 72,087; see also Goldstein v.
SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 877 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
135. 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-2(a) (2008); SEC Release: Hedge Fund Rule, supra note
95, at 72,070.
136. Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 877 (quoting SEC Release: Hedge Fund Rule, supra note 95,
at 72,059).
137. Jessica Natali, Note, Trimming the Hedges is a Difficult Task: The SEC's Attempt to
Regulate Hedge Funds Falls Short of Expectations, 15 U. MIAMI Bus. L. REv. 113, 115
(2006).
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The Commission believed that, if it were able to continuously monitor
and examine the practices of hedge fund advisers, it would be able to
"effectively detect fraud and misconduct at much earlier stages, deter
fraudulent activities, better protect the investing public, and increase the
quality and fairness of hedge fund price valuation."' 138 The Commission
stated in the release of the final rule that the "rule and rule amendments are
designed to provide the protections afforded by the Advisers Act to
investors in hedge funds, and to enhance the Commission's ability to
protect our nation's securities markets." 139
Under the Hedge Fund Rule, previously exempt advisers to hedge funds
now had to register with the Commission if they had fifteen or more
"clients." The rule defines a "private fund" as
an investment company that (a) is exempt from registration under the
Investment Company Act by virtue of having fewer than one hundred
investors or only qualified investors; (b) permits its investors to redeem
their interests within two years of investing; and (c) markets itself on the
basis of the 'skills, ability or expertise of the investment adviser.' 140
Due to the new definition of "private funds," and the specifications with
regard to who must be counted as a "client," most hedge fund managers
were required to register. 141 The rule mandated that these advisers, now
required to register under the new rule and rule amendments, do so by
February 1, 2006.142
C. Hedge Fund Regulation After Goldstein
This section discusses the D.C. Circuit's decision in Goldstein to vacate
the Hedge Fund Rule, and how the SEC has responded to the court's
holding. Part I.C. 1 sets forth the court's reasoning as to why it held that the
SEC had exceeded its authority when it tried to interpret the term "client" to
include the "shareholders, limited partners, members, or beneficiaries" of a
hedge fund. 143 Part I.C.2 addresses the Commission's response in choosing
not to challenge the circuit court's decision and then sets forth the elements
of the new antifraud rule that the SEC promulgated in response to
Goldstein.
138. Id. at 125 (citing STAFF REPORT ON THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS, supra note 33, at
76-80).
139. SEC Release: Hedge Fund Rule, supra note 95, at 72,054.
140. Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 877 (citation omitted) (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-
1(d)(1)).
141. Id. (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-2(a)). The rule also
trigger[ed] certain regulations that apply only to registered advisers. Most
importantly, registered advisers [were required to] open their records to the
Commission upon request and [could] not charge their clients a performance fee
unless such clients [had] a net worth of at least $1.5 million or at least $750,000
under management with the adviser.
Id. at 877 n.3 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-4, 80b-5 (2006)).
142. SEC Release: Hedge Fund Rule, supra note 95, at 72,054.
143. Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 874 (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-2(a)).
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1. Goldstein v. SEC
In Goldstein, Philip Goldstein, Kimball & Winthrop, Inc. (an investment
advisory firm Goldstein co-owned), and Opportunity Partners L.P.
challenged the Hedge Fund Rule's equation of "client" with "investor." 144
Goldstein's main contention with the rule was "that the Commission's
action misinterpreted § 203(b)(3) of the Advisers Act." 145
The court acknowledged that the Advisers Act does not define the term
"client," but rejected the SEC's argument that the lack of a definition
rendered the statute "ambiguous as to a method for counting clients."' 146
Although "client" is not defined, the court found that legislative history and
the definition of "investment adviser" provided support for the view that
"Congress did not intend 'shareholders, limited partners, members, or
beneficiaries' of a hedge fund to be counted as 'clients."1 47 The court held
that the SEC's definition of "client" under the Hedge Fund Rule was
"outside the bounds of reasonableness"' 148 and that it came close to
"violating the plain language of the statute." 149  The new rule was
overturned by the court, stating that "[a]bsent ... a justification" their new
interpretation of "client" seemed "completely arbitrary."'] 50
Although the court invalidated the rule, it noted that a later registration
requirement that is more narrowly tailored with regard to look-throughs
may be upheld.151 Also, if Congress were to amend the Advisers Act, it
"would effectively supersede Goldstein and expand the range of options
available to regulate this area." 152
144. Id.
145. Id. at 878.
146. Id. The court pointed out that just because a word is not defined, it does not
automatically render it ambiguous. Id.
147. See id. at 879. The court noted,
Although the statute does not define 'client,' it does define 'investment adviser' as
'any person who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising others,
either directly or through publications or writings, as to the value of securities or as
to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities.'
Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(11) (2006)). The court found this definition indicates that an
investor is not a client because an adviser to a hedge fund does not advise an investor as to
how to handle his capital, but rather, the adviser provides advice to the fund itself as to how
to invest the capital it has collected from its investors. Id. at 879-80.
148. Id. at 879-81.
149. Id. at 881 ("At best it is counterintuitive to characterize the investors in a hedge fund
as the 'clients' of the adviser.").
150. Id. at 883.
151. See JW. Verret, Dr. Jones and the Raiders of Lost Capital: Hedge Fund
Regulation, Part I, A Self-Regulation Proposal, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 799, 810 n.64 (2007)
(.'[T]he Commission has not justified treating all investors in hedge funds as clients for the
purpose of the rule. If there are certain characteristics present in some investor-adviser
relationships that mark a 'client' relationship, then the Commission should have identified
those characteristics and tailored its rule accordingly."' (quoting Goldstein, 451 F.3d at
883)).
152. Id. at 810.
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After the Goldstein decision, SEC Chairman Christopher Cox told
Congress that the SEC would continue to bring enforcement actions against
hedge funds and hedge fund advisers that violate the antifraud and other
provisions of the securities laws. 153 During Chairman Cox's testimony, he
declared that "[h]edge funds are not, should not be, and will not be
unregulated."' 154 With the importance that hedge funds have on the market,
it is inevitable that they will face "increased regulatory scrutiny which, after
Goldstein, will come largely in the form of enforcement actions and
investigations." 155
2. The New Antifraud Rule: The SEC's Response to Goldstein
In July 2007, the five SEC commissioners voted unanimously to adopt a
new antifraud rule under the Advisers Act that "prohibit[s] advisers to
pooled investment vehicles from defrauding investors or prospective
investors in pooled investment vehicles they advise."' 156 Rule 206(4)-8
(New Antifraud Rule) was promulgated in response to the Goldstein
decision. 157 The rule became effective on September 10, 2007, thirty days
after publication in the Federal Register. 158
The Commission felt that Goldstein created uncertainty with regard to
the application of sections 206(1) and (2) of the Advisers Act in relation to
investors who are defrauded by an investment adviser to that pool. 159 Prior
to Goldstein, the SEC "brought enforcement actions against advisers
alleging false and misleading statements to investors under sections 206(1)
and 206(2) of the Advisers Act." 160 The court of appeals in Goldstein held
that, "for [the] purposes of sections 206(1) and (2) of the Advisers Act, the
'client' of an investment adviser managing a pool is the pool itself, not an
153. See Thomas 0. Gorman & William P. McGrath, Jr., What Every Issuer, Director
and Officer Should Know About Current SEC Enforcement Policies and Trends, SEC. REG.
L.J., Summer 2007, at 1 (2007). When Chairman Cox testified before Congress, he made the
following statement:
[L]et me make very clear that notwithstanding the Goldstein decision, hedge funds
today remain subject to SEC regulations and enforcement under the antifraud, civil
liability, and other provisions of the federal securities laws. We will continue to
vigorously enforce the federal securities laws against hedge funds and hedge fund
advisers who violate those laws.
The Regulation of Hedge Funds: Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs, 109th Cong. 3 (2006) (statement of Christopher Cox, Chairman, U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission).
154. The Regulation of Hedge Funds: Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. 3 (2006) (statement of Christopher Cox, Chairman, U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission).
155. Gorman & McGrath, supra note 153, at 11.
156. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(4) (2006); SEC Release: Antifraud Rule, supra note 38, at
44,756.
157. SEC Release: Antifraud Rule, supra note 38, at 44,756.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 44,756-57.
160. Id. at 44,757 n.4 (citations omitted).
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investor in the pool.' 16 1 The court "distinguished sections 206(1) and (2)
from section 206(4) of the Advisers Act, which is not limited to conduct
aimed at clients or prospective clients of investment advisers."'1 62 The
Commission found that this view made it unclear whether the Commission
could continue to bring enforcement actions under sections 206(1) and (2)
when investors are defrauded by an investment adviser to that pool. 163
The New Antifraud Rule was adopted pursuant to the authority granted to
the SEC in section 206(4) of the Advisers Act. 164 Under the Advisers Act,
the Commission has "broad authority to protect against fraud" by
investment advisers. 165 Section 206(4) of the Advisers Act provides that it
is unlawful for investment advisers "to engage in any act, practice, or
course of business which is fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative," and it
instructs the Commission to adopt rules and regulations that "define, and
prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts, practices, and
courses of business as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative" by
advisers. 166 Although Goldstein called into question the scope of sections
206(1) and 206(2), the Commission's authority to adopt rules under 206(4)
to protect investors in pooled investment vehicles was not questioned. 167
The authority granted under section 206(4) is "broader in scope and [is] not
limited to conduct aimed at clients or prospective clients."' 168
The new rule seeks to enforce the authority of the Advisers Act
governing cases in which investors in a pool are defrauded by an adviser. 169
It has two parts: The first part, 206(4)-8(a)(1), specifically makes it
unlawful for an investment adviser to a pooled investment vehicle to make
any materially false or misleading statements to investors or prospective
investors. 170 The second part of the rule, 206(4)-8(a)(2), is purposefully
broader in prohibiting "other frauds."' 71
All investment advisers to pooled investment vehicles, regardless of
whether or not they are registered with the SEC, are subject to enforcement
of the new rule. 172 Rule 206(4)-8 covers investment advisers with respect
to any "pooled investment vehicle" they advise. 173 A pooled investment
vehicle is defined as "any investment company defined in section 3(a) of
161. Id. at 44,756-57.
162. Id. at 44,757 (citing Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
163. See id. at 44,756-57.
164. See id. at 44,757.
165. Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles; Accredited
Investors in Certain Private Investment Vehicles; Proposed Rule, Investment Advisers Act
Release No. IA-2576, 72 Fed. Reg. 400, 401 (Jan. 4, 2007) [hereinafter Proposal Release:
Antifraud Rule].
166. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(4) (2006).
167. See Proposal Release: Antifraud Rule, supra note 165.
168. Id. at 401.
169. See SEC Release: Antifraud Rule, supra note 38, at 44,757.
170. Id. at 44,758.





the Investment Company Act and any privately offered pooled investment
vehicle that is excluded from the definition of investment conipany by
reason of either section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company
Act." 174 This definition results in the rule's applicability to "advisers to
hedge funds, private equity funds, venture capital funds, and other types of
privately offered pools that invest in securities, as well as advisers to
investment companies that are registered with [the Commission]." 175
a. Prohibition of False or Misleading Statements
Under the first part of New Antifraud Rule, it would constitute a
"fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative act, practice or course of business
within the meaning of section 206(4)" if any investment adviser to a pooled
investment vehicle were to make
any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, to any investor or
prospective investor in the pooled investment vehicle. 176
The new rule prevents advisers from making false or misleading
statements to investors and prospective investors regardless of the context
in which those statements are made. This aspect of the rule differs from
rule 1 Ob-5 under the Exchange Act, which is applicable only when the fraud
is committed in connection with the offering, selling, or redeeming of
securities. 177  The Commission provided some examples of what is
prohibited under this part of the rule:
materially false or misleading statements regarding investment strategies
the pooled investment vehicle will pursue, the experience and credentials
of the adviser (or its associated persons), the risks associated with an
investment in the pool, the performance of the pool or other funds advised
by the adviser, the valuation of the pool or investor accounts in it, and
practices the adviser follows in the operation of its advisory business such
as how the adviser allocates investment opportunities. 178
This part of the New Antifraud Rule is modeled after sections 206(1) and
206(2) of the Advisers Act, which make it unlawful for advisers to commit
fraud upon clients or prospective clients. 179 Accordingly, the rule applies to
174. Id. Under section 3(c)(1) of the Investment Company Act, issuers of securities
(other than short-term paper) of which are beneficially owned by not more than 100 persons
and that is not making or proposing to make a public offering of its securities, are exempt
from regulation. Id. at 44,758 n.21. Section 3(c)(7) of the Act "excludes from the definition
of investment company an issuer the outstanding securities of which are owned exclusively
by persons who, at the time of acquisition of such securities, are 'qualified purchasers' and
that is not making or proposing to make a public offering of its securities." Id.
175. Id. at 44,758.
176. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-8(l)(1) (2008).
177. Proposal Release: Antifraud Rule, supra note 165, at 402.
178. SEC Release: Antifraud Rule, supra note 38, at 44,759.
179. Id.
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communications not only with current investors in the fund, but also to
prospective investors. 180 Therefore, the rule covers, for example, false or
misleading statements to prospective investors in "private placement
memoranda, offering circulars, or responses to 'requests for proposals,'
electronic solicitations, and personal meetings arranged through capital
introduction services." 81
b. Prohibition of Other Frauds
The second part of rule 206(4)-8 is purposefully broad in order to
prohibit deceptive conduct that may not involve statements. 182 The rule
makes it "a fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative act, practice, or course of
business" for an investment adviser to "[o]therwise engage in any act,
practice, or course of business that is fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative
with respect to any investor or prospective investor in the pooled
investment vehicle."'1 83
In enforcing the rule, the SEC is not required to demonstrate that an
adviser has violated rule 206(4)-8 deliberately. Therefore, the rule covers
negligent conduct, as well as reckless or deliberately deceptive conduct. 184
The rule does not give rise to a private cause of action, so investors are not
able to use it to sue a manager, but the Commission will enforce it through
civil and administrative enforcement actions.185
D. The Role of Government and Alternatives to SEC Enforcement
The continued growth of the hedge fund industry has attracted increased
attention and questioning as to whether there should be greater legal or
regulatory protections for investors in hedge funds.' 86 "Debate continues
among civil regulatory agencies and in Congress as to what, if anything,
should be done to regulate the industry to control potential fraud and
abuse."'187 Critics of regulation of the hedge fund industry argue that
overregulation could stifle the liquidity hedge funds bring to the securities
market.1 88 Others argue that hedge funds will move offshore to avoid the
180. Id. at 44,758-59.
181. Id. at 44,757-58.
182. Id. at 44,759.
183. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-8(a)(2) (2008).
184. See SEC Release: Antifraud Rule, supra note 38, at 44,759-60.
185. See id. at 44,757, 44,760.
186. Two major concerns with regard to hedge funds are whether their activities are a
threat to financial stability, and whether the current legal or regulatory protections
adequately protect hedge fund investors. This Note focuses only on the second concern.
187. Federal Bureau of Investigation, supra note 29.
188. Verret, supra note 151, at 825 (pointing to former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan
Greenspan as one such critic); see also Nomination of Alan Greenspan: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 25-26 (2004) (statement of




regulation. 189 This section discusses alternatives to SEC regulation in
response to increasing interest and concern over the growth of the hedge
fund industry. Part I.D. 1 analyzes the response of the President's Working
Group on Financial Markets (PWG) and summarizes its February 2007
release of Principles and Guidelines for Private Pools of Capital. Part I.D.2
reviews the best practices for hedge fund participants that were written by
two industry groups established by the PWG and released in April 2008.
Part I.D.3 discusses recommendations promulgated by the Managed Funds
Association (MFA) in response to the PWG's February release. Finally,
Part I.D.4 explores the role of Self-Regulatory Organizations (SROs) in the
U.S. securities industry.
1. PWG Principles and Guidelines
The PWG is chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury and comprised of
the chairs of the Federal Reserve Board, the SEC, and the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). 190 The PWG was created by
President Ronald Reagan's executive order issued "on March 18, 1988 in
order to [enhance] the integrity, efficiency, orderliness, and competitiveness
of our Nation's financial markets and [maintain] investor confidence." 91
On February 22, 2007, the PWG released its Principles and Guidelines
Regarding Private Pools of Capital (PWG Principles). 192 The PWG
Principles were intended to "guide U.S. financial regulators as they address
public policy issues associated with the rapid growth of private pools of
capital, including hedge funds," while trying to preserve the benefits
provided by these funds. 193 The principles provide a framework for
189. Id. at 827; Douglas Cumming, A Law and Finance Analysis of Hedge Funds 3 (Apr.
5, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=946298.
190. U.S. Treasury, Office of Domestic Finance, http://www.treas.gov/offices/domestic-
finance/financial-markets/fin-market-policy/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2008). The President's
Working Group on Financial Markets (PWG) was originally formed to study the stock
market crash of 1987, and "since then has periodically issued reports on various issues
affecting the U.S. markets, including a 1999 report on hedge funds assessing lessons learned
in the wake of the near-collapse of Long Term Capital Management." Kathleen A. Scott,
President's Working Group Issues New Guidelines for US Hedge Funds, FIN. SERVS.
ADVISORY UPDATE (White & Case LLP, New York, N.Y.), Mar. 2007, at 3, 3, available at
http://www.whitecase.com/files/FileControlcl 88a091-498f-43c5-95 11-930b45d47317/7483
b893-e478-44a4-8fed-f49aa917d8cf/Presentation/File/FSAU March_07.pdf.
191. INVESTORS' COMM., PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS, PRINCIPLES AND
BEST PRACTICES FOR HEDGE FUND INVESTORS 3 (2008) [hereinafter PWG BEST PRACTICES-
INVESTORS], available at http://www.amaicmte.org/Public/InvestorsCommitteeReport.pdf
(alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
192. PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., AGREEMENT AMONG PWG AND U.S.
AGENCY PRINCIPALS ON PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES REGARDING PRIVATE POOLS OF CAPITAL
(2007) [hereinafter PWG PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES], available at http://www.treas.gov/
press/releases/reports/hp272_principles.pdf
193. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, President's Working Group Releases
Common Approach to Private Pools of Capital: Guidance on Hedge Fund Issues Focuses on
Systemic Risk, Investor Protection (Feb. 22, 1007) [hereinafter PWG Release], available at
http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/hp272.htm.
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addressing two key goals: "mitigating the potential for systemic risk in
financial markets and protecting investors."' 194 The underlying philosophy
of the PWG Principles is "to encourage and improve transparency and
disclosure by pools and managers to counterparties, creditors, fiduciaries
and investors" while recognizing that "this transparency, disclosure and
supervisory vigilance should not discourage innovation."'1 95 These broad
principles are comprehensive but flexible in order "to endure as financial
markets continue to evolve" while providing a clear "principles-based
approach to address the issues presented by the growth and dynamism of
these investment vehicles."' 96
The preamble to the PWG Principles highlights, as the PWG noted in
1999, that "'[i]n our market-based economy, market discipline of risk-
taking is the rule and government regulation is the exception. "'197 The
report emphasizes as one of its "overarching principles" that "[p]rivate
pools of capital bring significant benefits to the financial markets," but
recognizes that they also "present challenges for market participants and
policymakers."' 198 The principles state that "[p]ublic policies that support
market discipline, participant awareness of risk, and prudent risk
management are the best means of protecting investors and limiting
systemic risk."' 199 They further provide that investor protection concerns
are most effectively addressed "through a combination of market discipline
and regulatory policies that limit direct investment in such pools to more
sophisticated investors. '200
The principles address private pools of capital and suggest that they
"maintain and enhance information, valuation, and risk management
systems to provide market participants with accurate, sufficient, and timely
information." 20 1 Investors are encouraged to "consider the suitability of
investments in a private pool in light of investment objectives, risk
tolerances, and the principle of portfolio diversification. '202 In addition, the
PWG calls on regulators and supervisors to "work together to communicate
and use authority to ensure that supervisory expectations regarding
counterparty risk management practices and market integrity are met. '20 3
The PWG Principles accept and address the risk involved with
investment in these private pools of capital. Although many of the
strategies and vehicles used by these private pools of capital "are by their
194. Robert K. Steel, Under Sec'y for Domestic Fin., U.S. Dep't of the Treasury,
Remarks on Private Pools of Capital (Feb. 27, 2007) [hereinafter Steel on Private Pools on
Capital], available at http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/hp280.htm.
195. Id.
196. PWG Release, supra note 193.
197. PWG PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES, supra note 192, at 1 (quoting LESSONS OF LTCM,
supra note 43, at 26).
198. Id.
199. PWG Release, supra note 193.
200. PWG PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES, supra note 192, at 1.





very nature potentially more opaque, illiquid, and complex than other
products," the option to invest in them is offered "only to certain approved
investors." 20 4  Therefore, when Under Secretary for Domestic Finance
Robert K. Steel discussed the PWG Principles, he stressed that investors
should "understand their investments and the corresponding risks and
should not expose themselves to intolerable risk levels." 20 5  He also
addressed the "possibility of a retiree having his or her pension reduced or
eliminated as a result of losses from a poorly performing hedge fund
investment. '20 6 Steel admonished that managers should "disclose risks to
investors" and that "investors [should] assess and understand the risks
associated with their investments." 20 7  He also underscored that "[a]ll
investment fiduciaries have a duty to perform due diligence to ensure that
their investment decisions on behalf of their beneficiaries and clients are
prudent and conform to established sound practices consistent with their
responsibilities." 20 8
2. PWG Principles and Best Practices
In September 2007, the PWG established two "blue-ribbon private-sector
committees" to build upon the PWG Principles by collaborating on industry
issues and developing best practices for hedge fund investors and asset
managers. 20 9 In June 2007, U.S. Secretary of Treasury Henry Paulson
announced the PWG's plan to "call upon experienced industry participants
who could lead the charge to raise standards for improving transparency
and accountability. ' 210 Thereafter, the PWG selected Eric Mindich, CEO
of Eton Park Capital Management, as chairman of the Asset Managers'
Committee, and Russell Read, Chief Investment Officer of the California
Public Employees' Retirement System, to chair the Investors'
Committee.21 The Asset Managers' Committee (AMC) is comprised of
"representatives from a diverse group of hedge fund managers representing
many different investment strategies" and is "charged with developing best
practices specifically for managers of hedge funds."212  The Investors'
Committee is comprised of "senior representatives from major classes of
institutional investors including public and private pension funds,
foundations, endowments, organized labor, non-U.S. institutions, funds of
hedge funds, and the consulting community" and is "charged with
developing best practices specifically for those making hedge fund





209. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, PWG Private-Sector Committees Release
Best Practices for Hedge Fund Participants (Apr. 15, 2008) [hereinafter PWG Best Practices
Release], available at http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/hp927.htm.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.; see also PWG BEST PRACTICES-INVESTORS, supra note 191, at 4.
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investments." 213 The April 2008 press release about the resulting "separate
yet complimentary sets of best practices" heralded this to be "the most
comprehensive public-private effort to increase accountability for
participants in this industry. '214
Consistent with the PWG Principles, the Best Practices for Hedge Fund
Investors (Best Practices for Investors) cautions that investment in hedge
funds is only suitable for "sophisticated and prudent investors who are able
to identify, analyze and bear the associated risks, and follow appropriate
practices to evaluate, select, monitor, and exit these investments." 215 The
stated goal of the report, which is comprised of a "Fiduciary's Guide" and
an "Investor's Guide," is "to define a set of practice standards and
guidelines for fiduciaries and investors considering or already investing in
hedge funds on behalf of qualified individuals and institutions." 216
The Fiduciary's Guide, which is aimed at those with portfolio oversight
responsibilities, "provides recommendations to individuals charged with
evaluating the appropriateness of hedge funds as a component of an
investment portfolio."217 Fiduciaries are directed to "exercise proper care
in assessing whether a hedge fund program is appropriate and whether they
employ or can engage investment professionals with sufficient skill and
resources to initiate, monitor, and manage such a program successfully." 218
The Fiduciary's Guide then discusses hedge funds and outlines important
characteristics and issues that should be considered by a fiduciary when
deciding what percentage of a fiduciary's total portfolio should be allocated
to hedge funds.219 It then discusses minimum requirements for developing
"policies that define the key features and objectives of the hedge fund
investment program" and includes a list of questions that should be
addressed. 220 The final issue addressed under the Fiduciary's Guide is the
213. PWG BEST PRACTICES-INVESTORS, supra note 191, at 4. The Investors' Committee
plans to "meet semiannually and issue clarifications and additions when appropriate." Id.
214. PWG Best Practices Release, supra note 209 ("The recommendations complement
each other by encouraging both types of market participants to hold the other more
accountable.").
215. PWG BEST PRACTICES-INVESTORS, supra note 191, at 1.
216. Id. at 2. The Investors' Committee is clear to point out that each individual or
institution considering or managing hedge fund allocations is different and therefore, each
much evaluate the best practices, "determine which apply, and implement the
recommendations that are reasonable given the resources available to the investor, its
objectives and risk tolerance, and the particular investments under consideration." Id. at 3.
217. Id. at 1.
218. Id. at 6. In order to assess the appropriateness of a hedge fund program, the
Investors Committee instructs a prudent fiduciary to address questions on the following
issues: "Temperament"; "Manager Selection"; "Portfolio Level Dynamics"; "Liquidity
Match"; "Conflicts of Interest"; "Fees"; and "Citizenship." Id. at 6-7.
219. Id. at 8-9. Some of the important features discussed include the typical fee structure
of hedge fund managers, whether hedge funds are newly formed, the experience or
sophistication of hedge fund managers. Id. at 9-12.
220. Id. at 12. The list of questions includes the following: "What is the strategic
purpose of investing in hedge funds?" "What role will hedge funds play in the total
investment portfolio?" "Is the hedge fund program consistent with the applicable investment
beliefs, objectives, and risk profile of the investment program?" "What are the performance
2008]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
due diligence process, which is "the set of procedures used to gather
information about a particular investment for the purpose of deciding
whether the investment opportunity is appropriate." 221  A fiduciary is
instructed to "review the history of the investment management firm and its
professionals, the firm's past and current portfolios, its investment
philosophy, its decision processes for implementing the investment
strategy, its organizational culture, and its internal economic incentives" in
order to understand how a hedge fund may perform in different future
scenarios. In addition, "the due diligence process should also include an
evaluation of the business infrastructure, investment operations, and
controls in place to support the hedge fund's investment strategy. '222
Finally, it is important that a fiduciary continually monitor a manager and a
hedge fund investment because, "[w]hile the initial due diligence serves to
qualify a hedge fund as a desirable investment, the ongoing monitoring
process continually reaffirms that the assumptions used in the initial
selection remain valid. '223
The Investor's Guide describes best practices and guidelines for
investment professionals charged with "executing and administering a
hedge fund program once a . . . hedge fund [has been added] to the
investment portfolio." 224  This portion of the report provides
recommendations that "focus on how investors can apply appropriate due
diligence standards to verify that hedge fund managers are following best
practices and identify independent controls and processes to further
safeguard their assets." 225 These recommendations are divided into seven
broad categories: "the due diligence process; risk management; legal and
and risk objectives of the hedge fund investment program?" "Who will manage the hedge
fund investment program and what responsibilities will they have?" "What investment
guidelines will apply to the range of funds and strategies that can be utilized, the number of
funds to be targeted, and the risk and return targets for those funds?" Id.
221. Id. Although due diligence is generally important for all investment activities, the
committee warns that
particular care should be exercised in due diligence of hedge funds, because of the
complex investment strategies they employ; the fact that hedge fund organizations
are frequently young and small; their use of leverage and the associated risks; the
possibilities of concentrated exposure to market and counterparty risks, and the
generally more lightly regulated nature of these organizations.
Id.
222. Id. at 13.
223. Id. at 14 ("Key aspects of the monitoring process should include reviewing the
investment strategy and investment performance for consistency, maintaining awareness of
factors that could indicate potential style drift, and confirming that there has been no
material change to the business operations of the fund manager.").
224. Id. at 1. The term "investor" is used narrowly in the Investor's Guide "to refer to the
internal and external personnel who are responsible for actually implementing and executing
these programs." Id. at 16.
225. Id. at 16. Where appropriate, the committee "specified certain procedures or
approaches that [it] believe[s] would add significant transparency and increase investors'
ability to understand and evaluate funds' risks and returns." Id.
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regulatory considerations; valuation; fees and expenses; reporting; and
taxation." 226
The due diligence process for investors begins prior to making an
investment and is continued while the investment is held. When deciding
whether to invest in a hedge fund, investors often use due diligence
questionnaires to gather information about managers, conduct meetings
with fund managers, and interview a fund's current investors and business
counterparties. 227 The committee recommends that "[i]nvestors should
check references, research the hedge fund's key service providers, verify
factual information using independent sources, and follow-up with the
fund's personnel if the investors have trouble locating data or discover
information that poses concerns." 228 Moreover, investors should "evaluate
the reputation, credit rating, regulatory history, and background of the
individuals and entities who will be involved in the management and
administration of the hedge fund's investments." 229 After the investment is
made, its long-term success requires "[o]ngoing monitoring of all the hedge
funds in a portfolio, and the management of those funds." 230
The next section of the Investor's Guide addresses risk management
through suggesting "best practices for establishing the investor's own risk
management framework and best practices for evaluating the risk
management framework employed by a hedge fund manager."'231 This is
important because "[e]ffective risk management practices help investors
protect their assets, manage their expectations in selecting hedge funds,
mitigate exposure to unanticipated risks, and support informed, disciplined
investment decisions." 232 This section discusses various categories of risk
that are important for a hedge fund investment program to address, such as
"investment risk, liquidity and leverage, market risk, operational risk,
business continuity, and conflicts of interest. '233  Best practices are
suggested in order to monitor and manage each of these risks.234
The Legal and Regulatory section of the Investor's Guide surveys the
laws applicable to hedge funds and what investors should be aware of,
226. Id. at 16-17.
227. Id. at 17. The report suggests questions that may be used for a due diligence
questionnaire, which the committee contends "should ask probing questions into the material
aspects of a hedge fund's business and operations." Id. This section also discusses investor
considerations and provides best practices with regard to personnel, the "strength of a hedge
fund manager's business model," the performance track record of the hedge fund, the fund's
"ability to maintain the investment style or styles upon which the investor originally
evaluated or selected it as part of a hedge fund portfolio," and model use. Id. at 19-22.
228. Id. at 17.
229. Id.
230. Id. Also, it is noted that "once an applicable lock-up period expires, the decision
whether to redeem should be deliberate and scrutinized regularly for as long as the




234. See id. at 22, 24-37.
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including, but not limited to, confirmation that the fund complies with these
laws, confirmation of jurisdiction over the fund, and the elements relating to
a hedge fund's governing documents that "describe the legal and business
terms of an investment in that fund. '235  The Investor's Guide also
discusses what an investor should consider with regard to valuation, which
"is the key to deciding whether to make an investment and to calculate
returns from that investment over time." 236 Guidance is provided on what a
valuation policy should include, how valuation is governed, and on
different valuation methodologies and controls. 237 The report also provides
guidance on the fees and expenses of hedge fund managers, the quality of
reports and fund transparency, and taxation.238  The Investor's Guide
concludes by reinforcing that "hedge funds require in depth and continuous
oversight by their investors," and that it is the investor's responsibility "to
understand the essential risk and reward prospects of each hedge fund
investment. '2 39
The Best Practices for the Hedge Fund Industry (Hedge Fund Industry
Report) recommends "innovative and far-reaching practices that exceed
existing industry-wide standards" that seek to increase accountability for
hedge fund managers and "[c]alls on hedge funds to adopt comprehensive
best practices in all aspects of their business including the critical areas of
disclosure, valuation of assets, risk management, business operations, and
compliance and conflicts of interest. '240 The AMC states their belief that
these recommendations raise "the bar for the industry by providing strong
and clear guidance to managers for strengthening their practices in ways
that investors demand and the markets require," but also provide "managers
with appropriate flexibility to continue to innovate and grow." 241
The Hedge Fund Industry Report focuses on five key areas that "would
most effectively promote investor protection and reduce systematic risk,"
including disclosure, valuation, risk management, trading and business
operations and compliance, conflicts, and business practices. 242 The first
235. Id. at 39; see also id. at 37-43.
236. Id. at 43.
237. See id. at 43-48.
238. See id. at 49-57.
239. Id. at 57.
240. ASSET MANAGERS' COMM., PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., BEST
PRACTICES FOR THE HEDGE FUND INDUSTRY, at i-ii (2008) [hereinafter PWG BEST
PRACTICES-INDUSTRY], available at http://www.amaicmte.org/Public/AMC-Report.pdf.
The Asset Managers' Committee (AMC) notes that the evolution of hedge funds has led to a
"greater need for them to develop and maintain robust infrastructure, controls and business
practices." Id. at ii. It also notes that sophisticated institutional investors "have demanded
that hedge funds demonstrate appropriate infrastructure and controls in managing their
activities." Id.
241. Id. at iii.
242. Id. The report establishes a framework for each of the five issues that
1) states the goal and essential elements of the framework; 2) outlines clear and
consistently applied policies and procedures that provide a structure to help ensure
better educated investors and better managed hedge funds implement the
framework; 3) incorporates a regular process for reviewing and updating the
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issue addressed by the report is disclosure, which "sets forth basic elements
of disclosure that managers should make available to all investors. '243
Disclosure is particularly important because "[i]nvestors need material
information to assess whether to invest in a fund or redeem an investment,
as well as to monitor their exposure to their ongoing investment. '244 The
AMC looked at the disclosure requirements for U.S. public companies and
sought to use elements of this regime in adopting best practices for the
hedge fund industry. Necessary information "includes the provision of a
private placement memorandum, annual audited financial statements,
periodic performance information and other investor communications, as
well as timely disclosure of significant events in light of the
circumstances." 245 Furthermore, the report recommends that hedge funds
"produce independently audited, [Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (GAAP)]-complaint financial statements. '2 46  Disclosure to
counterparties, such a banks and broker-dealers, is also addressed in
addition to disclosure to investors.247
The Hedge Fund Industry Report then addresses valuation and
"recommends that managers adopt a valuation framework that provides for
consistent and documented policies and appropriate controls for segregation
of responsibilities between portfolio managers and those responsible for
valuations. '2 48 As previously discussed, valuation of investments is of
critical importance to investors. The report discusses several valuation
considerations that are unique to hedge fund investments and "recommends
establishing clear practices for effective control and segregation
systems." 249 With regard to risk management, the AMC recommends that
"managers adopt a comprehensive framework to measure, monitor, and
manage risk consistently with the intended risk profile." 250 After a risk
framework; and 4) requires adequate resources and knowledgeable personnel to
support the framework.
Id. at iv.
243. Id. at iv.
244. Id.
245. Id. at v. The "manner and frequency with which these disclosures will be made"
should be determined by managers and clearly communicated to investors. Id.
246. Id. ("Public companies produce independently audited, GAAP-compliant financial
statements. Because hedge fund investors share the need for accurate, independently
verified financial information, we recommend that all hedge funds do (or continue to do) the
same."). It is further recommended that managers "provide periodic performance
information to investors and provide an investor letter or similar communication and risk
report on at least a quarterly basis." Id.
247. Id. at v-vi.
248. Id. at vi.
249. Id. The framework provided "establishes a governance mechanism, such as a
valuation committee, which [would] have ultimate responsibility for establishing and
monitoring compliance with the manager's valuation policies." Id.
250. Id. at viii ("The common elements of the framework should be that managers
identify risks to the portfolio, measure the principal categories of risk (such as liquidity risk,
leverage, market risk, counterparty credit risk and operational risk), adopt policies and
procedures that establish monitoring and measurement criteria, maintain a regular and
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profile is established, managers should develop a "process to measure,
monitor and manage risk in order to achieve that intended risk profile." 251
Although the report "recommends that managers regularly disclose risk
information," the AMC recognizes "that confidentiality remains important
to the manager's business, so it is not expected that investors will be
provided with all information used to monitor risk. '252
Additionally, the report discusses how managers must continuously
assess the effectiveness of their operational and internal control, which
includes "processes for documenting relationships with counterparties,
establishing appropriate infrastructure to accommodate the types of
investments traded by the fund and adequately managing and accounting
for the fund's internal operations."2 53 The last issue requires "a continued
commitment to the highest standards of integrity and professionalism within
the industry." 254 The report emphasizes that the managers that have already
developed strong and effective practices to address the five areas discussed
above "have found that implementing strong internal controls and business
practices has provided a platform for stability and growth, enhanced client
relationships, and enabled them to carry out investment activities more
effectively and efficiently. 255
3. Best Practices for Hedge Funds
Over the past few years, major groups related to the hedge fund industry
"have published extensive documents related to 'best practices' for both
investors in and managers of hedge funds."256 The Investor's Committee
suggested that these best practices "may be useful resources for
investors." 257 One example of such a publication is 2007's Sound Practices
for Hedge Fund Managers (Sound Practices). The MFA, a leading hedge
fund trade group, released Sound Practices in response to the PWG's call
for the hedge fund industry to adopt best practice standards. 258 Sound
Practices is a set of recommendations that provides hedge fund managers
"with a framework of internal policies, practices, and controls from a peer-




253. Id. at ix.
254. Id.
255. Id. at x-xi.
256. PWG BEST PRACTICES-INVESTORS, supra note 191, at 16. Some of the groups
listed in the Investor's Guide include the Managed Funds Association (MFA), the
Greenwich Roundtable, the Alternative Investment Management Association (AIMA), and
the Chartered Financial Institute (CFA) Institute. Id.
257. Id.
258. See generally SOUND PRACTICES, supra note 53. The MFA has been "the unifying
voice of the hedge fund industry" for over 16 years. Id. preface, at 1. The MFA's mission is
"to protect the interests of the industry, to educate policy makers, and to assist its Members
[to] better grow and conduct their businesses." Id. For more information about the MFA, see
Managed Funds Association, http://www.managedfunds.org (last visited Oct. 24, 2008).
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to-peer perspective." 259 The MFA intends for these recommendations to
enhance the ability of fund managers to "manage operations, satisfy
responsibilities to investors, comply with applicable regulations, and
address unexpected market events. '260
The recommendations specifically address a hedge fund manager's
relationship and responsibility to investors. They suggest, among other
things, that "investors should have the tools to understand and evaluate for
themselves the risks associated with" investing in a hedge fund and that
hedge fund managers "should provide investors with adequate information
to enhance the investors' ability to understand and evaluate their
investment. '261 Section 2.1 provides that a hedge fund manager has a
responsibility to act in the best interest of the fund and its investors, and that
they "must also act in accordance with its investment management
agreement with the Hedge Fund, the offering documents of the Hedge
Fund, and applicable law." 262 Section 2.2 recommends that a
[m]anager should provide prospective and existing Hedge Fund investors
with information regarding the Hedge Fund's investment objectives and
strategies, range of permissible investments, material risk factors, and the
material terms of an investment in the Hedge Fund. This information
should be sufficient to enhance the ability of investors to understand and
evaluate their investment in the Hedge Fund.263
The MFA also provides a "Model Due Diligence Questionnaire for
Hedge Fund Investors," which was "designed to identify the kinds of
questions that a potential investor may wish to consider before investing in
a [h]edge [flund. '' 264 It "addresses risks to potential investors such as hedge
funds' incentive compensation structure, their use of leverage and margins
and the valuation of assets, including illiquid investments."2 65  This
questionnaire can assist prospective and existing investors in hedge funds in
asking hedge fund managers valuable questions regarding the terms of an
investment, as well as in learning about the management and investment
practices of the hedge fund manager. 266  Providing an investor with
"[i]nformative disclosure regarding the material terms of an investment in a
Hedge Fund (e.g., applicable charges, expenses, withdrawal or redemption
rights and restrictions, reporting, use of 'side pockets', etc.) and the Hedge
Fund's investment objectives and strategies enhance[s] the ability of
investors to form proper expectations as to the Hedge Fund's
259. SOUND PRACTICES, supra note 53, intro., at 1.
260. Id. intro., at 5.
261. Id. § 2, at 1.
262. Id. § 2.1, at 2.
263. Id. § 2.2, at 2.
264. Id. app. II.
265. Stephanie Baum, Hedge Fund Industry Group Tightens Guidelines, FIN. NEWS





performance. '267 Since investors should be able to understand and evaluate
their investment, managers "should attempt to prepare appropriate
disclosures for dissemination to Hedge Fund investors on a timely basis,
without compromising proprietary information regarding the Hedge Fund's
trading positions. '268
Section 2.4 advises that a manager identify and adequately describe risks
to be disclosed to hedge fund investors. 269  A manager should also
"periodically provide investors with relevant performance data and, when
appropriate, risk information regarding the strategy and terms of the Hedge
Fund. ' 270 The manager "should engage qualified independent auditors to
audit the annual financial statements of any Hedge Fund with investors not
affiliated with the Hedge Fund Manager."' 271 A manager should develop
valuation policies and procedures, recognizing that investors "may both
subscribe to and redeem interests in a Hedge Fund in reliance on the values
derived from such policies and procedures. 272
4. Statutory Self-Regulatory Organizations
One of the key components in the SEC's regulation of the U.S. securities
markets is self-regulation. 273 Prior to the enactment of the federal securities
laws, the securities industry had already established an unofficial system of
self-regulation. 274 In 1792, the historic Buttonwood Agreement formed the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the first organized stock market.275
As stock exchanges developed, trading conventions became formalized as
exchange rules. 276
Following the Great Depression and the stock market crash of 1929,
Congress promulgated a collection of acts known as the federal securities
laws. 277 In section 6 of the Exchange Act, "Congress recognized the
regulatory role of exchanges, and required all existing securities exchanges,
267. SOUND PRACTICES, supra note 53, § 2.2, at 3.
268. Id. § 2.2, at3.
269. Id. § 2.4, at 5.
270. Id. § 2.5, at 6.
271. Id. § 2.8, at 7.
272. Id. § 2.9, at 7.
273. Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation, Exchange Act Release No. 34-50700,
69 Fed. Reg. 71,256, 71,256 (Dec. 8, 2004) [hereinafter Concept Release].
274. Id. at 71,257.
275. Id.
276. Id. The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) Constitution was adopted in 1817,
which was followed by the adoption of a range of rules governing the NYSE's "members
and listed companies, including member financial responsibility rules and listed company
registration and financial reporting rules." Id.
277. JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 3 (5th ed.
2006). First, Congress promulgated the Securities Act. Act of May 27, 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat.
74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2006)). The Securities Act regulates the
public offering and sale of securities in interstate commerce. Cox ET AL., supra, at 3. This
was followed by the Exchange Act, which gave birth to the SEC. Act of June 6, 1934, ch.
404, title I, § 1, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78111).
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including the NYSE, to register with the Commission and to function as
self-regulatory organizations." 278  The Exchange Act called for a
"cooperative regulatory effort by the SEC and industry-sponsored groups
(SROs)." 279
In 1938, the securities industry and the SEC joined forces to convince
Congress to amend the Exchange Act.280 The Maloney Act, which was
adopted in 1938, "amended the Exchange Act by adding a new Section 15A
and establishing the concept of registered national securities association
SROs." 281  The task of these "national securities association[s]" is to
"prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and to promote just and equitable
trade practices among over-the-counter broker-dealers." 282 Currently, the
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) and the National
Futures Association (NFA) are the only registered national securities
associations.283 The NASD was registered in 1938 as the first national
278. Concept Release, supra note 273, at 71,257. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78111.
279. Cox ET AL., supra note 277, at 16. This addition to the Exchange Act provided for a
"considerable degree of self-regulation for the nation's stock exchanges." Marianne K.
Smythe, Government Supervised Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry and the Antitrust
Laws: Suggestions for an Accommodation, 62 N.C. L. REv. 475, 477 (1984).
280. COX ET AL., supra note 277, at 16. Over-the-counter (OTC) securities are securities
that are not registered with a stock exchange. Smythe, supra note 279, at 483. The stock
market crash of 1929 severely damaged the public reputation of OTC securities dealers. "In
1933, in an effort to improve their collective image, OTC dealers formed the Investment
Bankers Code Committee ('IBCC'), which promulgated industry best practices." Concept
Release, supra note 273, at 71,257. After observing the efforts of such groups, "the
Commission and leaders of the investment banking community generally agreed that an
industry association needed official legal status in order to effectively carry out the task of
self-regulating the OTC market." Id.
281. Concept Release, supra note 273, at 71,257; see The Maloney Act, Pub. L. No. 75-
719, 52 Stat. 1070 (1938) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o). The Maloney Act
authorized the SEC "to register national securities associations." Concept Release, supra
note 273, at 71,256 n.4. Under the original Exchange Act, OTC brokers and dealers were
directly regulated by the SEC. However, after the Act was passed it became apparent that it
would be too burdensome for the SEC to directly regulate this OTC market. Smythe, supra
note 279, at 483-84.
282. COx ET AL., supra note 277, at 16. "[T]here are four types of [self-regulatory
organizations (SROs)] embraced by the Exchange Act: the national securities exchanges,
the national securities association, registered clearing agencies, and the Municipal Securities
Rulemaking Board (MSRB)." Id. The two most important SROs are the exchanges and the
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD). Id. "A 'national securities exchange' is
a securities exchange that has registered with the SEC under Section 6 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934." U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Exchanges,
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/mrexchanges.shtml (last visited Oct. 24, 2008).
There are currently ten securities exchanges registered as national securities exchanges with
the SEC. Id. The ten registered national securities exchanges are: American Stock
Exchange; Boston Stock Exchange; Chicago Board Options Exchange; Chicago Stock
Exchange; International Securities Exchange; Nasdaq Stock Market LLC; National Stock
Exchange (formerly the Cincinnati Stock Exchange); New York Stock Exchange; NYSE
Arca, Inc. (formerly the Pacific Exchange); and Philadelphia Stock Exchange. Id.
283. Concept Release, supra note 273, at 71,257. The NASD was the only registered
national securities association until recently. The NFA was "registered for the limited
purpose of regulating the activities of members who are registered as brokers or dealers in
security futures products under Section 15(b)(1 1) of the Exchange Act." Id. at 71,257 n.26.
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securities association under section 15A of the Exchange Act. 284 The
NASD is the largest of all SROs. 285 It has a broad scope of responsibility
that "includes overseeing the operation of the over-the-counter market and
establishing and enforcing rules for its efficient and fair operation. ''286
Brokers or dealers are required to register with the SEC under section
15(a)(1) if they offer, sell, or purchase securities. 287 Pursuant to sections
15(b)(8) and (9), it is "unlawful for any registered broker or dealer who is
not a member of a national securities association to make any security
transaction unless those transactions occur solely on an exchange in which
he is a member." 288
The Exchange Act has always provided the SEC with a certain degree of
oversight of SRO activity.289 The objective is to have the SEC act as both
the regulator and supervisor of the self-regulation carried out by the
SROs. 290 Concurrently, the SROs act as regulators, having rulemaking and
disciplinary powers over their members. 291 The Exchange Act's vehicle for
providing the SEC with power over each type of SRO rests heavily upon
the requirement that each SRO must register with the SEC.292 Before any
SRO is eligible to register with the SEC, it must satisfy certain minimum
requirements. 293 These requirements include:
1. The SRO must not be a burden on commerce and must accept as
members all persons satisfying its requirements.
2. The SRO's governance procedures must ensure fair representation for
its members (one or more of its directors must, however, be a
representative of issuers or investors).
3. The SRO must have rules designed to prevent fraudulent and
manipulative practices.
4. The SRO must enforce the Exchange Act provisions as well as its own
rules.
5. Disciplinary procedures must be fair and assure minimum due process
and entail appropriate sanctions.




288. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(8)-(9) (2006).
289. COX ET AL., supra note 277, at 1022. The potential conflicts of interest raised by
allowing for this type of self-regulation led Congress to provide the SEC a degree of
oversight of SRO activity.
290. Id. at 102 1.
291. Id. at 1022. Each SRO has rules that govern conduct by members in order to protect
investors, securities markets, and the trading markets operated by the SRO in question. Id.
292. Id. at 1021-22.
293. Id. at 1022.
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6. The SRO must have the capacity to fulfill its operational role under the
Exchange Act as well as be able to enforce compliance with the Act and
the SRO's rules by its members. 294
In 1975, Congress clarified and strengthened the SEC's regulatory role
through amendments to the Exchange Act.295  One example of the
additional oversight provided by the amendments is found under sections
19(b) and (c), which prescribe that the SEC must approve any rule change
proposed by the SRO, and may, on its own motion, "abrogate, add to, and
delete from" the SRO's rules.2 96 In addition, the Commission is authorized
to review disciplinary actions taken by SROs against their members and to
require exchanges and associations to keep records and to file reports with
the Commission. 297
There is a moral hazard with self-regulation "when an organization both
serves the commercial interests of and regulates its members or users. '298
There are also inherent limitations in allowing an industry to regulate itself,
such as
"the natural lack of enthusiasm for regulation on the part of the group to
be regulated, the temptation to use a faqade of industry regulation as a
shield to ward off more meaningful regulation, the tendency for
businessmen to use collective action to advance their interests through the
imposition of purely anticompetitive restraints as opposed to those
justified by regulatory needs, and a resistance to changes in the regulatory
pattern because of vested economic interests in its preservation." 299
Despite the potential problems caused by conflicts of interest, the
practical advantages of self-regulation have been viewed as outweighing the
potential dysfunctions. 300  In enacting these provisions, "Congress
concluded that self-regulation of both the exchange markets and the OTC
[over-the-counter] market was a mutually beneficial balance between
government and securities industry interests." 30 1 One of the most important
mutual benefits of self-regulation is that it enables the securities industry to
be supervised by an organization that is "familiar with the nuances of
securities industry operations. '302  Industry participants' expertise and




297. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78s(d)(2), 78q(a)(l) (2006).
298. Concept Release, supra note 273, at 71,256.
299. Joel Seligman, Should Investment Companies Be Subject to a New Statutory Self-
Regulatory Organization?, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1115, 1120 (2005) (quoting JOEL SELIGMAN,
THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 440 (3d ed. 2003)).
300. Id.; see also Concept Release, supra note 273, at 71,256 (noting that the securities
laws "reflect Congress'[s] determination to rely on self-regulation as a fundamental
component of U.S. market and broker-dealer regulation, despite this inherent conflict of
interest").
301. Concept Release, supra note 273, at 71,257.
302. Id.
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to respond quickly to regulatory problems.30 3 Self-regulation is preferred
by industry participants as being less invasive regulation by their peers, as
opposed to direct government regulation; and the government "benefit[s] by
being able to leverage its resources through its oversight of self-regulatory
organizations." 30 4 In addition, due to the complexities of securities trading
practices, it is desirable that SROs be intimately involved in setting and
enforcing proscriptive standards. 30 5  Another benefit of SROs is that
regulation is funded by members of the industry or profession affected,
rather than by the general public through taxation. 306
II. RESPONSE TO THE NEW ANTIFRAUD RULE
The SEC originally proposed rule 206(4)-8 in December 2006.307 The
Commission received forty-five comment letters in response to the
antifraud portion of the proposal. 30 8 Despite a range of concerns raised
over the effectiveness and sustainability of the proposed rule, the
Commission adopted the rule in its original form. 309 Part II.A discusses the
two most frequently raised contentions with the rule. Part II.B then
summarizes the support offered for the rule and tracks the Commission's
response to the issues raised in Part II.A. Finally, Part II.C sets forth
alternative means for protecting investors in hedge funds from fraud.
A. Challenges to the New Rule
This section summarizes some of the arguments articulated in the
comment letters in response to the proposal for the New Antifraud Rule,
dubbed the Proposal Release. Part II.A.1 explores the argument that the
"broad authority" granted to the Commission under section 206(4) is not
sufficient to support the promulgation of rule 206(4)-8. Part II.A.2
discusses Commissioner Paul S. Atkins's arguments regarding the rule,
along with the disagreement expressed by others in comment letters with
regard to the lack of a scienter requirement.
303. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 21(A) OF THE SECURITIES
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 REGARDING THE NASD AND THE NASDAQ MARKET 7 (1996)
(discussing some of the advantages of SROs).
304. Concept Release, supra note 273, at 71,257. In enacting the Maloney Act in 1938,
Congress stated that an approach to securities regulation relying solely on government
regulation "would involve a pronounced expansion of the organization of the [SEC]; the
multiplication of branch offices; a large increase in the expenditure of public funds; an
increase in the problem of avoiding the evils of bureaucracy; and a minute, detailed, and
rigid regulation of business conduct by law." Id. (citation omitted).
305. Id.
306. See generally Smythe, supra note 279.
307. Proposal Release: Antifraud Rule, supra note 165.
308. SEC Release: Antifraud Rule, supra note 38, at 44,757.
309. Id.
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1. Breadth of the Commission's Authority
Many of the comment letters argued that the promulgation of the
proposed rule does not fall within the "broad authority" granted to the
Commission by section 206(4).310 Some of the letters look to congressional
intent in promulgating section 206(4) and to other rules that the SEC has
created under this authority to support the argument that the language of the
New Antifraud Rule is overly broad and lacks sufficient specificity or
guidance, and therefore falls outside the statutorily defined authority
granted to it by Congress. The authors of these comment letters express
concern that the rule's overbroad language and lack of guidance may
interfere with the new rule's applicability in the event of an enforcement
action.
One of the arguments raised with respect to the scope of the New
Antifraud Rule submits that Congress did not intend for the Commission to
make such broad rules under section 206(4). In adopting section 206(4),
Congress stated that,
[b]ecause of the general language of the statutory antifraud provision and
the absence of any express rulemaking power in connection with them, it
is not clear what fraudulent or deceptive activities are prohibited by this
act and as to how far the Commission is limited in this area by common-
law concepts of fraud and deceit.3 11
The comment letter submitted by the Investment Company Institute
argued that this language indicates legislative intent to "prohibit advisers
from engaging in fraudulent activities in a way that was not limited by
common law concepts of fraud," and to permit the Commission to make
rules "that either define a particular practice as unlawful unless specific
requirements are met or require advisers to implement procedures to protect
against committing fraud."' 312  In particular, emphasis was placed on
Congress's use of the word "define" as indicating that their intention was to
grant the Commission power to enact only specific rules that "provide
advisers with concrete guidance as to what constitutes fraudulent,
deceptive, and manipulative behavior. '313
310. Id. at 44,757.
311. Comment Letter from Sullivan & Cromwell LLP to Nancy M. Morris, Sec'y, U.S.
Sec. & Exch. Comm'n 2 (Mar. 9, 2007) [hereinafter Sullivan & Cromwell Letter], available
at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-25-06/s72506-559.pdf (quoting S. REP. No. 86-1760, at
8 (1960)).
312. Comment Letter from Elizabeth Krentzman, Gen. Counsel, Inv. Co. Inst., to Nancy
M. Morris, Sec'y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n 3-4 (Mar. 9, 2007) [hereinafter ICI Letter],
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-25-06/s72506-565.pdf.
313. Comment Letter from Keith F. Higgins, Chair, Comm. on Fed. Regulation of Sec.,
Am. Bar Ass'n, to Nancy M. Morris, Sec'y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n 2 (Mar. 12, 2007)
[hereinafter ABA Letter], available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-25-06/s72506-
584.pdf; see also Sullivan & Cromwell Letter, supra note 311, at 2 ("Congress
contemplated, therefore, that the Commission's rulemaking authority would be used to
articulate and deal adequately with specific fraudulent activities, e.g., 'such problems as a
2008]
FORDHAMLA W REVIEW
In support of the position that the Commission's authority is limited to
creating rules that articulate and deal with "specific fraudulent activity,"
some of the comment letters provided examples of other provisions enacted
by the Commission under section 206(4).314 In reviewing these rules,
Sullivan & Cromwell LLP concluded that each of these other rules "either
define a particular practice as unlawful unless specific requirements are met
or require advisers to implement procedures to protect against fraudulent
activity. ' 315 Similarly, the American Bar Association (ABA) suggested
that in all of these rules, the Commission defined and prescribed the
prohibited conduct with the specificity required to provide advisers "with
notice of prohibited conduct and to allow them to conform their practices
accordingly." 316
Sullivan & Cromwell continued its analysis of the scope of the rule by
focusing on the second part of rule 206(4)-8, suggesting that the
Commission did not adequately demonstrate its authority to adopt this
provision.3 17  It contended that the broadly phrased second provision
"provides no detail as to what constitutes fraudulent, deceptive or
manipulative conduct."'318 In addition, the letter drew attention to the fact
that the release failed to provide "any examples of the conduct it seeks to
address" under this part of the rule. 3 19 Therefore, the firm suggested that
this provision might cause the rule to be successfully challenged.
320
The lack of clarity with regard to what type of conduct the New
Antifraud Rule seeks to regulate led to concern over how it would be
applied by the Commission and its staff.32 1 In its comment letter, Schulte
material adverse interest in securities which the adviser is recommending to his clients."'
(quoting S. REP. No. 86-1760, at 8 (1960))).
314. See Sullivan & Cromwell Letter, supra note 311, at 2 n.4 (citing as examples "Rule
206(4)-i (detailing advertisement content of registered advisers that has a tendency to
mislead); Rule 206(4)-2 (specifying conditions pursuant to which a registered adviser may
[take] custody [of] client funds and securities); Rule 206(4)-3 (specifying conditions
pursuant to which a registered adviser may make cash payments for client solicitations);
Rule 206(4)-4 (requiring registered advisers to disclose certain financial and disciplinary
information to clients); Rule 206(4)-6 (requiring written policies and procedures, and
disclosure to clients, in respect of proxy voting by registered advisers); and Rule 206(4)-7
(requiring registered advisers to have chief compliance officers and compliance policies and
procedures)"); see also ABA Letter, supra note 313, at 2.
315. Sullivan & Cromwell Letter, supra note 311, at 2; see also Comment Letter from
Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP, to Nancy M. Morris, Sec'y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n 4 (Mar.
9, 2007) [hereinafter Schulte Letter], available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-25-
06/s72506-549.pdf.
316. ABA Letter, supra note 313, at 3.
317. Sullivan & Cromwell Letter, supra note 311, at 2-3.
318. Id. at 2 ("The Second Prong provides no detail as to what constitutes fraudulent,
deceptive or manipulative conduct and verges on stating a tautology: 'it shall constitute a
fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative act, practice, or course of business . . . to . . .




321. Id.; see Schulte Letter, supra note 315, at 2.
[Vol. 77
THE SEC'S NEW ANTIFRAUD RULE
Roth & Zabel LLP claimed that the lack of clarity "may lead to Staff
interpretations that do not have the benefit of the formal rule-making
process. '322 This may result in informal rulemaking that "sometimes leads
to inconsistent interpretations from different regional offices" and does not
provide sufficient notice to advisers as to what practices are prohibited by
the rule.323  The firm suggested that this lack of clarity could "chill
communications between advisers, their clients, and the Commission." 324
2. Lack of a Scienter Requirement
The most consistently raised contention with the New Antifraud Rule
was the lack of a scienter requirement. The comment letters suggested that
a culpable mental state, for example, intent or recklessness, should be
required for section 206(4) liability. The absence of a scienter requirement
was also addressed by Commissioner Atkins.
Commissioner Atkins wrote a separate concurring opinion to the SEC's
adoption of the New Antifraud Rule--dubbed the Adopting Release-to
express his disagreement with the Commission's conclusion that scienter is
not a required element for violation of the rule. 32 5 Commissioner Atkins
presented two main objections: First, "that a negligence standard is [not]
consistent with the Commission's authority under Section 206(4)."326
Second, that even if such a standard were within the Commission's
authority, for policy reasons, a finding of scienter should be required as part
of establishing a violation under the New Antifraud Rule. 327
Commissioner Atkins first addressed the SEC's argument that "the
language of section 206(4) is not limited to knowing or deliberate conduct"
because it prohibits "deceptive" conduct.328 The SEC asserted that because
section 206(4) encompasses "deceptive" conduct, it includes "conduct that
is negligently deceptive as well as conduct that is recklessly or deliberately
deceptive." 32 9 However, Commissioner Atkins contested this conclusion,
claiming it was inappropriate because it was "reached by looking at the
term 'deceptive' apart from its companion terms," 330 and the U.S. Supreme
Court has said "it is a 'familiar principle of statutory construction that
words grouped in a list should be given related meaning."' 33 1
Atkins instead focused on the inclusion of the word "manipulative" in
section 206(4) in arguing that the rule should have a scienter
requirement. 33 2 He looked to the Supreme Court's decision in Ernst &
322. Schulte Letter, supra note 315, at 3.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 2.
325. SEC Release: Antifraud Rule, supra note 38, at 44,761-63.









Ernst v. Hochfelder for support of this argument.333 In its review of section
10(b) of the Exchange Act, the Hochfelder court found that
[u]se of the word "manipulative" is especially significant. It is and was
virtually a term of art when used in connection with securities markets. It
connotes intentional or willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud
investors by controlling or artificially affecting the price of securities. 334
Based on this interpretation, Commissioner Atkins concluded that, similar
to the language of section 10(b), the language of section 206(4) "would
seem then to suggest a scienter requirement. '335
Despite Commissioner Atkins's conclusion that the language of section
206(4) suggested a scienter requirement, the Commission cited the decision
of SEC v. Steadman to support of its decision not to include such a
requirement. 336 In Steadman, the D.C. Circuit held that "scienter is not
required under section 206(4)." 337 In reaching this decision, the court relied
on the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Aaron v. SEC.338
In Aaron, the Supreme Court found that "the language of § 17(a) strongly
suggests that Congress contemplated a scienter requirement under §
17(a)(1), but did not under § 17(a)(2) or § 17(a)(3)." 339 The Court found
that "[t]he language of § 17(a)(1), which makes it unlawful 'to employ any
device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,' plainly evinces an intent on the part
of Congress to proscribe only knowing or intentional misconduct. '340
Despite the possibility that the term "defraud" is ambiguous, the Court
found that "the terms 'device,' 'scheme,' and 'artifice' all connote knowing
or intentional practices." 341 For additional support for their decision, the
Court noted that the term "device" was also prominent in the Court's
decision in Hochfelder, where it held "that the plain meaning of § 10(b)
embraces a scienter requirement. '342
In contrast to the Court's holding that section 17(a)(1) requires a showing
of scienter, the Court found that section 17(a)(3) does not require that the
misconduct be knowing or intentional:
[T]he language of § 17(a)(3), under which it is unlawful for any person
"to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit," .., quite plainly focuses
333. Id. (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976)).
334. Id. (quoting Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 199).
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id. (citing SEC v. Steadman, 967 F.2d 636, 647 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).
338. Steadman, 967 F.2d at 647 (citing Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980)).
339. Aaron, 446 U.S. at 695-96.
340. Id. at 696.
341. Id. (footnote omitted).
342. Id. "In addition, the Court in Hochfelder noted that the term 'to employ,' which
appears in both § 10(b) and § 17(a)(1), is 'supportive of the view that Congress did not
intend § lOb to embrace negligent conduct." Id. at 696 n. 14 (quoting Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at
199 n.20).
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upon the effect of particular conduct on members of the investing public,
rather than upon the culpability of the person responsible. 34 3
In Steadman, the court compared the language of section 206(4) to the
language of sections 17(a)(1) and 17(a)(3) under the Securities Act. 344 The
court found that the language of 206(4) more closely resembled the
language of section 17(a)(3) than it did the language of section 17(a)(1),
which, as the Supreme Court found in Aaron, would require scienter.345
The court distinguished section 17(a)(3)'s use of the terms "device, scheme,
or artifice," which the "Aaron Court believed connoted so strongly a
knowledge or intent requirement," 346 from the adjectives "fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative" used in section 206(4).347 The Steadman court
found that "the more neutral 'act, practice, or course of business' language"
of section 206(4) was "similar to section 17(a)(3)'s 'transaction, practice, or
course of business"' language. 348 The court concluded that, similar to
section 17(a)(3), section 206(4) focused on the "effect of particular conduct
. . . rather than upon the culpability of the person responsible." 349
Therefore, in accordance with the Supreme Court's holding in Aaron, the
court held that "scienter is not required under section 206(4)."350
Commissioner Atkins, along with several of those who wrote comment
letters, found several points of contention with the Steadman court's
analysis and decision. One issue raised by both Atkins and the ABA was
with the application of the comparison of the wording of sections 206(2)
and 17(a)(3) to a comparison of the wording of sections 206(4) and
17(a)(3). In short, the ABA concluded that they "are not comparable." 35 1
In Aaron, the Supreme Court "placed considerable weight on the terms
'operate' or 'would operate,' neither of which appears in section 206(4)."352
According to the ABA, the absence of the "operates as" language means
that it does not "focus on the effect of conduct. '3 53 Instead, section 206(4)
"uses the affirmative word 'is,' which would seem to de-emphasize
343. Id. at 696-97. "This reading follows directly from Capital Gains, which attributed
to a similarly worded provision in § 206(2) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 a
meaning that does not require a 'showing [of] deliberate dishonesty as a condition precedent
to protecting investors."' Id. at 697 (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375
U.S. 180, 200 (1963)).
344. Id.




349. Id. (quoting Aaron, 446 U.S. at 697).
350. Id.
351. ABA Letter, supra note 313, at 4.
352. SEC Release: Antifraud Rule, supra note 38, at 44,762 (citing Aaron, 446 U.S. at
696-97).
353. ABA Letter, supra note 313, at 4 ("Section 206(4) prohibits conduct that 'is
fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative' . . . and focuses on whether the investment adviser is




effect. '354 The ABA also argued that "the fact that a practice or course of
business 'operates' as a fraud is distinguishable from a practice or course of
business that 'is' itself a fraud. 355 Review of these differences led to the
conclusion that the "conduct must be accompanied by a culpable mental
state" to be "fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative. '356
Commissioner Atkins also pointed out that, "while Section 17(a)(3)
speaks of only 'fraud' and 'deceit,' Section 206(4) also includes [the term]
'manipulative. 357  In its comment letter, the ABA suggested that the
inclusion of the term "manipulative" in section 206(4), and lack of the term
in section 17(a)(3), is significant because Congress's use of the term
denotes its "desire to punish conduct that is designed to deceive or
defraud. '358 In support of this argument, it pointed to several occasions on
which the Supreme Court has read the term "manipulative" to indicate that
the actor must act with intent or knowledge. 359
Commissioner Atkins also drew attention to the similarities between
section 206(4) and section 14(e) under the Exchange Act. Section 206(4)
"was modeled on Section 15(c)(2) under the [Exchange Act]. ' 360 Section
14(e) also follows the pattern of section 15(c)(2). 361 In addition, section
14(e), which relates to tender offers, is similar to section 206(4) in that it
includes "both a proscription against 'engag[ing] in any fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices,"' in addition to "a directive
that the SEC 'by rules and regulations define[] and prescribe means
reasonably designed to prevent such acts and practices as are fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative.' 362 Due to the similarities between these two
rules, Commissioner Atkins found it "useful to look at the Supreme Court's
interpretation of Section 14(e)." 36 3
He first addressed the Supreme Court's decision in Schreiber v.
Burlington Northern, Inc., in which the Court held that "the term
'manipulative' as used in § 14(e) requires misrepresentation or
nondisclosure." 364  The Supreme Court looked to the "textual similarity
354. Id.
355. Id. (explaining that a practice or course of business that "operates" as a fraud is
much more inclusive because the practice or course of business may not necessarily itself be
a fraud).
356. Id.
357. SEC Release: Antifraud Rule, supra note 38, at 44,762.
358. Id.
359. Id. (citing Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc. 472 U.S. 1 (1985); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976)). In Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 199, the Supreme Court
stressed that the "[u]se of the word 'manipulative' is especially significant."
360. SEC Release: Antifraud Rule, supra note 38, at 44,762. "Section 15(c)(2) makes it
unlawful for brokers and dealers to effect transactions in or induce the purchase or sale of
securities in connection with which they 'engage[] in any fraudulent, deceptive, or
manipulative act or practices, or make[] any fictitious quotation."' Id. (alterations in original)
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(2) (2006)).
361. Id.
362. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e)).
363. Id.
364. Schreiber, 472 U.S. at 11.
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between Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act (which requires a showing of
scienter) and Section 206, and held that the term "manipulative" as used in
Section 14(e) 'connotes conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors
by controlling or artificially affecting the price of securities.' ' 365 The
Schreiber Court also pointed out that, despite the addition of the rulemaking
authority under section 14(e), this provision does not "suggest[] any change
in the meaning of 'manipulative' itself. ' 36 6 Atkins then looked to United
States v. O'Hagan, another case in which the Supreme Court reviewed
section 14(e). 367 In dealing with rule 14e-3(a), the Court held that it "was
within the SEC's authority under Section 14(e) because Section 14(e)
allows the SEC to 'prohibit acts, not themselves fraudulent under the
common law or § 10(b), if the prohibition is reasonably designed to prevent
• . . acts and practices [that] are fraudulent."'' 368  What Commissioner
Atkins inferred from these cases is that "the SEC cannot effect a change in
the meaning of specific statutory terms under its comparable Section 206(4)
rulemaking authority. '369
Commissioner Atkins also explained his disagreement with the SEC's
contention that "use of a negligence standard is an appropriate method
reasonably designed to prevent fraud. '370 Although the SEC defended its
adoption of a negligence standard as a means reasonably designed to
prevent fraud by citing O'Hagan, Commissioner Atkins found that the
present rule "differs markedly from the rules at issue in O'Hagan and
Steadman."371 The rules in those cases were "narrowly targeted rules that
covered clearly-defined behavior. They were designed to prohibit conduct,
that, although outside of the 'core activity prohibited' by the statute, were
designed to 'assure the efficacy' of the statute." 372 Unlike those rules, rule
206(4)-8(a)(2) is broadly phrased and "essentially repeats the statutory
prohibition." 373 Therefore, he maintained that lowering that standard of
care could not logically be the "type of 'means reasonably designed to
prevent' within the contemplation of the regulatory mandate within Section
206(4)." 374 He even suggested that lowering the standard of care is "an
attempt to rewrite the statute by assigning new definitions to the words of
365. ABA Letter, supra note 313, at 4 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Schreiber, 472 U.S. at 11-12).
366. SEC Release: Antifraud Rule, supra note 38, at 44,762 (quoting Schreiber, 474 U.S.
at 11 n. 1l).
367. Id. As Atkins noted, in O'Hagan, the Court "considered whether Rule 14e-3(a),
which prohibits trading on undisclosed information in connection with a tender offer,
exceeds the SEC's authority under Section 14(e) given that the prohibition applies regardless
of whether there is a duty to disclose."
368. Id. at 44,763 (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S.
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the statute. ' 375  This change in mental state may then be considered
contrary to the statute itself, which could then interfere with the SEC's
ability to use the rule effectively.376
The ABA also challenged the Commission's authority by arguing that
section 206(4) does not expand the Commission's authority to "define"
fraud.3 77 It argued that the original meaning of fraud is "not negligent
conduct, but instead, conduct that has some element of scienter or
deliberateness." 378  Therefore, although the Commission has power to
prescribe rules to prevent fraud, section 206(4) does not give it authority to
create the New Antifraud Rule because that would expand the concept of
fraud itself beyond its original meaning. 379
The comment letters also looked to the scienter requirements in rule lOb-
5 and other prominent securities fraud laws in support of requiring scienter
for rule 206(4)-8. The Proposal Release explained that the wording of the
New Antifraud Rule is similar to other antifraud laws and rules, including
rule lOb-5. 380 However, unlike the current rule, rule lOb-5 requires that the
adviser act with scienter.381 The MFA claimed that "it is inapposite and
fraught with the potential for adverse impacts to adopt wording from a
different rule that requires a finding of scienter in order for a violation to
have occurred, into a rule that is intended to require a finding of only simple
negligence." 382
One serious concern raised in the comment letters was the unintended
consequences this rule might have. A rule without a scienter requirement
could undercut the Commission's desire to enhance hedge fund
transparency. The ABA suggested that classifying undefined, unintentional
material omissions or misstatements as fraudulent within the adviser-
investor relationship would "chill" communication. 383 Similarly, in its
comment letter, Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP warned that this rule would
create a high risk of reduced disclosure to, and communication with,
investors because the advisers will have to worry that, "despite no intent to
mislead investors or knowledge of any misstatements, they will be held to
have violated Rule 206 under the Advisers Act."'384
In the comment letter submitted by Dechert LLP, the firm explained that,
without a scienter requirement, "the proposed rule would have the effect of
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. ABA Letter, supra note 313, at 3.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. SEC Release: Antifraud Rule, supra note 38, at 44,759.
381. Id.
382. MFA Letter, supra note 75, at 10.
383. ABA Letter, supra note 313, at 3.
384. Comment Letter from Nora M. Jordan, Yukako Kawata, Leor Landa & Danforth
Townley, Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, to Nancy M. Morris, Sec'y, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n 2 (Mar. 9, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-25-06/s72506-
570.pdf.
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creating both uncertainty on the part of hedge fund advisers as well as the
possibility of strict liability . . . for innocent or minor violations of the
strictures of Rule 206(4)-8.-385 This possibility for liability would result in
hedge fund advisers choosing to "provide more limited information to
investors, which would have the effect of limiting the frequency and quality
of communications between the adviser and a fund's investors. 386
Limiting communication would have damaging effects; specifically, it
would "result in diminishing an investor's understanding of and ability to
evaluate potential investments and to discourage meaningful, candid and
informative discourse between fund advisers and investors." 387 Therefore,
the commenters urged the Commission that, in order to avoid such adverse
consequences, the rule must include a scienter requirement.
B. Support for the New Antifraud Rule
This section discusses the support offered in the comment letters for the
new rule. Supporters of the rule found that efforts to clarify and strengthen
existing safeguards for investors in investment adviser fraud were necessary
and suggested that the proposed rule "achieve[d] a reasonable balance of
providing important benefits to investors at an acceptable cost to the
industry." 388 This section also tracks the SEC's reaction to the commenters
that disagreed with the adoption of the rule.
1. Breadth of the Commission's Authority
Although the comment letters suggested that the authority granted by
Congress under section 206(4) is not broad enough to withstand challenge
of their authority in promulgating the new rule, the Commission adopted
rule 206(4)-8 as it was originally released. The Commission acknowledged
the commenters' interpretation that its power is limited to adopting
"prophylactic rules that explicitly identify conduct that would be fraudulent
under the new rule. '389 It believed, however, that its authority under
section 206(4) is broader than the commenters suggested. The Commission
asserted that Congress expected that it would use the authority provided by
section 206(4) to "'promulgate general antifraud rules capable of
flexibility." 390
385. Comment Letter from David A. Vaughan & George J. Mazin, Dechert LLP, to




388. Comment Letter from Kurt N. Schacht, Managing Dir. & Linda L. Rittenhouse,
Senior Policy Analyst, CFA Ctr. for Fin. Mkt. Integrity, to Nancy M. Morris, Sec'y, U.S.
Sec. & Exch. Comm'n 1 (Mar. 9, 2007) [hereinafter CFA Letter], available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-25-06/s72506-537.pdf.
389. SEC Release: Antifraud Rule, supra note 38, at 44,759 (citing ABA Letter, supra
note 313; ICI Letter, supra note 312; Schulte Letter, supra note 315; Sullivan & Cromwell
Letter, supra note 311).
390. Id. at 44,757 (quoting S. REP. No. 86-1760, at 4 (1960)).
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The Commission stated that the terms "material false statements or
omissions and 'acts, practices, and courses of business as are fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative"' are consistent with the "well-developed body
of law under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws."391 It
concluded that the "legal authorities identifying the types of acts, practices,
and courses of business that are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative
under the federal securities laws are numerous," and therefore, that the
conduct prohibited by the rule is "sufficiently clear and well
understood. 392
The Commission rejected the call for more detailed rules describing
specific forms of fraudulent conduct by suggesting that such detailed rules
could provide a roadmap for those wishing to engage in fraudulent
conduct. 393 The Commission refused to adopt such an approach, claiming
that it would be inconsistent with "historical application of the federal
securities laws under which broad prohibitions have been applied against
specific harmful activity." 394
2. Lack of a Scienter Requirement
Although commenters argued that lack of a scienter requirement was not
consistent with the Commission's authority or would "'expand the concept
of fraud itself beyond its original meaning,"' the Commission insisted that
the language of section 206(4) is not limited to knowing or deliberate
conduct. 395  As noted in Commissioner Atkins's concurrence, the
Commission cited the language of section 206(4) as encompassing "'acts,
practices, and courses of business as are . . . deceptive,"' which it
interpreted to reach conduct that is negligently deceptive as well as reckless
or deliberate. 396
The Commission relied heavily on Steadman.397  As previously
discussed, the Steadman court analogized the wording of section 206(4) of
the Advisers Act to the language used in section 17(a)(3) of the Securities
Act.398 Through this analogy, and with reference to the Supreme Court
decision in Aaron, which held that section 17(a)(3) does not require a
showing of scienter to establish liability, the Steadman court concluded that
"scienter is not required under section 206(4)."399
The Commission also cited O'Hagan to support its belief that a
negligence standard is appropriate as a method reasonably designed to
391. SEC Release: Antifraud Rule, supra note 38, at 44,758.
392. Id.
393. Id. at 44,759.
394. Id.
395. Id. (citing ABA Letter, supra note 313, at 3).
396. Id. (citing ABA Letter, supra note 313, at 3).
397. See SEC v. Steadman, 967 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding that scienter is not
required under section 206(4)).
398. See supra Part II.A.2.
399. Steadman, 967 F.2d at 647.
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prevent fraud.400 The Commission quoted the Court in O'Hagan, noting
that "'[a] prophylactic measure, because its mission is to prevent, typically
encompasses more than the core activity prohibited.' 40 1 The Commission
believed that if advisers take sufficient care to avoid negligent conduct, they
"will be more likely to avoid reckless deception. '402 It follows that, since
the Commission is able to "prescribe conduct that goes beyond fraud as a
means reasonably designed to prevent fraud," then "prohibiting deceptive
conduct done negligently is a way to accomplish this objective." 40 3
C. Alternatives to Regulation by the SEC
This section discusses alternatives to regulation by the SEC that may be
effective in protecting hedge fund investors from fraud. Part II.C. 1
discusses some of the problems that may arise as a result of regulation. Part
II.C.2 explores the possibility of the hedge fund industry regulating itself.
Part II.C.3 discusses establishing an organization of institutional investors
to certify hedge funds. Part II.C.4 then discusses the SEC's establishment
of an SRO to regulate the industry and considers the effectiveness of such
an approach.
1. Problems with Regulation
In determining how to effectively regulate the hedge fund industry, it is
important to balance several relevant issues. One issue that must be
considered is that the imposition of constraints on domestic hedge funds'
management may result in substantial migration of the industry to offshore
jurisdictions without similar constraints.40 4 If funds migrate to offshore
jurisdictions, oversight is "reduced for the industry and eliminated
altogether for the migrating hedge funds." 40 5 Therefore, imposing overly
constraining regulation on the domestic hedge fund industry could have the
effect of limiting regulation of these funds by encouraging them "to migrate
to more lax jurisdictions without substantially reducing their investor
base." 406
In addition, the rapid expansion of hedge fund investments is an obstacle
posed for government regulation because it is transforming the price
discovery functions of the securities markets. Although this transformation
yields positive results in creating more efficient valuation and robust flows
of capital, these innovative strategies morph rapidly and operationally,
which poses a problem for government regulators who are notoriously slow
400. SEC Release: Antifraud Rule, supra note 38, at 44,759.
401. Id. (quoting O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 672-73).
402. Id.
403. Id. at 44,759-60.
404. Harvey Westbrook, Jr., Hedge Fund Industry Structure and Regulatory Alternatives
6 (Sept. 8, 2003), available at http://www.q-group.org/archives-folder/pdf/Westbrook.pdf.
405. Id.
406. Id. at 7.
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to respond to rapid market innovation.40 7 Another consideration is whether
regulation by the SEC would make a difference, based on critics
questioning "whether the SEC can anticipate hedge fund malfeasance if it
could not anticipate such problems through its oversight of mutual
funds."4 °8
Increased disclosure requirements may be helpful for some investors in
tracking the funds' investments, but "[i]n order for disclosure to be an
effective regulatory mechanism, investors will have to be able to monitor
the impact of manager decisions on the portfolio. '409 Harvey Westbrook,
Jr., a financial economist in the SEC's Office of Economic Analysis,
asserted that, in a hedge fund environment, "where investment strategies are
dynamic and involve complicated long-short strategies, illiquid holdings,
and derivative arbitrage strategies, 'snapshot' portfolio composition
information" is not very informative to investors.410 He also pointed out
that, due to the absence of a secondary market for hedge fund shares, there
is no clear way for them to "attach value to hedge fund management if the
manager concentrates the portfolio in illiquid assets. '411 Therefore, due to
often varied and complex investment strategies, even the most sophisticated
investors "are not likely to possess the expertise to consistently monitor
hedge fund managers." 412
2. Self-Regulation
One possibility besides regulation by the SEC is to follow the suggestion
of the PWG and let the private market regulate itself through
encouragement and support from the government oversight body.413 The
PWG Principles suggest that hedge fund managers "should have
information, valuation, and risk management systems that meet sound
industry practices and enable them to provide accurate information to
creditors, counterparties, and investors with appropriate frequency, breadth,
and detail. '414 The Best Practices for Investors, the Hedge Fund Industry
Report, and MFA's Sound Practices provide guidelines for hedge fund
managers to comply with this requirement.
The successful development and implementation of such guidelines
would set standards within the industry. This approach may only be
407. See Verret, supra note 151, at 800, 818 (following the arguments supporting use of
SROs in our capital markets); see also generally Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as
Regulator, 83 VA. L. REv. 1453 (1997) (arguing that exchanges serve as more effective
regulators than government institutions due to their inability to respond to rapid market
innovation).
408. Verret, supra note 151, at 826.
409. Westbrook, supra note 404, at 22.
410. Id.
411. Id. at23.
412. Id. at 24-25.
413. Id.
414. Verret, supra note 151, at 835 n.182 (quoting PWG PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES,
supra note 192, at 5).
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successful, however, if the guidelines are adopted and adhered to by those
within the industry. 415 For self-regulation to work, there must be market
and investor confidence that is adequate and consistently employed.416
3. Hedge Fund Certification
Another common issue in looking at the future of hedge funds is that
institutional investors, including pension funds and university endowments,
"are beginning to aggressively invest in the hedge fund industry and are a
potential source of substantial investment growth in the future." 417
Therefore, it is possible that these increasingly influential institutional
investors may be in a better position to influence transparency and develop
best practices, as opposed to regulation by the SEC. After discussing
several other regulatory alternatives, Westbrook concluded that hedge fund
certification is the best solution to regulate the hedge fund industry. 418
In his analysis, Westbrook looked at the problem of regulating the hedge
fund industry as a monitoring problem which he stated as follows: "How
does a regulator encourage sophisticated investors to use their market power
to require hedge funds to establish and follow minimal standards of
operational practice?" 419 He found that institutional investors are likely to
gain market power "from being a primary source of future growth for the
hedge fund industry." 420  Under this framework, institutional investors
would reduce their own operational risk monitoring costs by pooling their
expenses to establish standards for "fund 'certification' by creating a
'certification body' to enact industry standards." 421  "Through the
certification body, institutions could establish the minimal operational and
415. Kurt Schacht, Strict Conduct Code Needed for Hedge Fund Managers, INVESTMENT
NEWS, Aug. 20, 2007, at 8, available at http://www.investmentnews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/
article?AID=/20070820/FREE/70816005/101 1/TOC. Kurt Schacht is the managing director
of the CFA Centre for Financial Market Integrity. CFA has also developed a self-regulatory
template related to the hedge fund industry titled "The Asset Manager Code of Professional
Conduct," which "focuses on setting a baseline for compliance, professional conduct and
investor protections." Id.
416. Id.
417. Westbrook, supra note 404, at 25; see also supra notes 31-34 and accompanying
text.
418. Id. at 18-27. Some of the regulatory approaches that Harvey Westbrook explores
are "restrictions on the number (or type) of investors, investment management restrictions,
disclosure based regulations (requiring some disclosure of holdings to fund investors), [and]
risk management based regulations (requiring specified risk management procedures to be
followed)." Id. at 18-19.
419. Id. at 25.
420. Id.
421. Id. Westbrook describes operational risk as "the fund specific risk of a particular
hedge fund's business operations." Id. at 9. It can be decomposed into several different
categories, such as "money transfer risk, valuation risk, systems risk, clearance risk,
regulatory risk, [and] human factor risk." Id. Due to "the idiosyncratic nature of operational
risk, and its variability across the hedge fund industry, operational risk can not be adequately
measured by standard risk measures, but is appropriately evaluated only through
fundamental bottoms-up analysis and due diligence." Id.
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qualifications standards hedge funds must satisfy on an ongoing basis in
order to qualify for institutional investments. '422
Hedge funds that met the certification requirements "could choose
whether or not to obtain certification. '423 If "certified," a fund could use
their certification "as a signal of the quality of its operations and possibly
the qualifications of management. '424 An investment in a certified fund
could also "serve as a signal to pension beneficiaries that their hedge fund
exposure meets appropriate operation standards. '425 Although Westbrook
acknowledged that this approach does not account for "the incentive
differences between institutional investors and small investors," he
concluded that "institutional investors are best suited to establish
certification standards and, indirectly, the baseline for industry-wide best
practices." 426
4. Creation of an SRO
Another alternative proposed to provide enhanced protection for hedge
fund investors is to establish a new SRO. 427 Although SEC enforcement
actions such as those brought under the New Antifraud Rule are beneficial,
it is suggested that these should be viewed as a "residual mechanism. '428
The creation of an SRO could provide greater investor protection because it
would focus on preventing the fraudulent conduct from occurring in the
first place. 429
A recent article by J.W. Verret explores the SEC's previous efforts to
combat hedge fund fraud and-anticipating future regulatory efforts-seeks
to craft a regulatory regime that would more effectively achieve that
goal. 430 According to Verret, the benefits provided by hedge funds and the
risks associated with unnecessarily tight constraints require that any
regulation be "narrowly tailored to abusive practices" and that the costs of
such regulation are weighed to "ensure that [they] do not outweigh the
422. Id. at 26.
423. Id.
424. Id.
425. Id. In order for this approach to effectively reduce operational risk, "institutions
must limit, at least to some degree, their investments to certified hedge funds." Id.
Limitations to investing in these certified funds would be necessary because "[i]f the
certification signal does not attract sufficient investment, institutional or otherwise, hedge
funds will have no reason to subject themselves to additional due diligence requirements."
Id. In addition, in order for other investors to take the certification process seriously, the
institutions themselves must take it seriously. Id.
426. Id. at 27.
427. See Verret, supra note 151; see also Simeon G. Mann, Too Far over the Hedge:
Why the SEC's Attempt to Further Regulate Hedge Funds Had to Fail & What, If Any,
Alternative Solutions Should Be Considered, 82 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 315, 354-57 (2008).
428. See Seligman, supra note 299, at 1126.
429. Id.
430. See generally Verret, supra note 151 (reviewing the Hedge Fund Rule promulgated
by the SEC, which was struck down in 2006 by the D.C. Circuit in Goldstein).
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benefits." 431 He proposes a self-regulatory model that could utilize the
"inherent advantage of firms regulating each other," and, if crafted
correctly, could "help to overcome the severe disadvantage that
bureaucratic regulators face in this field. ' 432 Verret suggests that this new
model could be effectuated through the creation of a new self-regulatory
organization for hedge funds, or it could encourage more action by self-
regulatory mechanisms already in place "through the form of safe harbors
from adviser registration. '433
Verret explores the comparison of costs to benefits that are associated
with regulation or reform of the hedge fund industry. Self-regulation,
Verret contends, would be more likely than government regulation to
minimize the cost impact because an SRO, made up of industry
representatives, would be more sensitive to the effect of compliance costs
on the industry.434 He suggests that government regulators, as opposed to
industry participants, face "no penalty for over-regulation, and indeed may
have political or turf-guarding incentives to overregulate. ' 435 Therefore, if
an SRO had incentives to properly regulate, "it would be more likely to
seek cost-effective strategies. '436
In his analysis, Verret compares the relationship between an investor and
the investment adviser who manages the investor's money to a
principal/agent relationship. 437 In this model, the investor is the principal,
who "contracts with the investment adviser, as agent, to manage the assets
of the investor diligently and for a specified fee or a specified percentage of
the amount by which the adviser can make the investment grow. '438
Therefore, a principal/investor hires the agent/adviser to perform a service
that requires delegation of authority.439  Typically, principals seek to
"create incentives for agents to limit aberrant activities," while the agent
"frequently expend[s] bonding costs to ensure principal interest and
maintain a profitable relationship. '440  However, if information
asymmetries exist between the parties and the agents/advisers are able to
take advantage of those asymmetries "to engage in profitable aberration at
431. Id. at 815-16.
432. Id. at 800.
433. Id. at 811.
434. Id. at 816. Verret measures costs as "(1) compliance costs of hedge funds, (2) [the]
opportunity cost of trades not undertaken due to an artificial dampening of risk appetite, (3)
legal costs of private and governmental compliance, and (4) enforcement costs." Id. at 815
(citations omitted). Benefits are "measured as investment appreciation due to fraud
prevention, less any appreciation realized as a result of fraud that is never ultimately
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the principals' expense and without the principals' knowledge, it may be
rational for [them] to do so."441
In viewing the investment management situation this way, the
information asymmetry that minimizes monitoring by principals or
investors is the "lack of disclosure of hedge funds to their investors." 442
The social harm caused from the agent/adviser's aberrant behavior "might
be market instability or investor losses due to fraud."'443 One possibility for
correcting this harm would be the government's imposition of a penalty for
fraud. However, this would add an additional social cost "as social
resources are used to conduct compliance audits." 444  In addition, as
previously discussed, government regulation would be ineffective because
"government regulators are severely constrained in their ability to regulate
rapidly innovating markets." 445 Therefore, a better alternative may be to
"let the private market regulate itself through encouragement and support
from the government oversight body. 446
The advantages of self-regulation, as discussed above, may address the
difficulties faced by the government due to "rapid functional change." 447
Verret argues that "[o]rganizations composed of financial institutions have
some interest in ensuring the viability of a market for a profitable activity,
such as hedge fund investing, that is harmed by those members who violate
best practices." 448  Therefore, an SRO, as a group, might "have many
interests that coincide with those of market regulators." 449
As discussed above in Part I.C.3, national securities regulation has
always utilized some form of self-regulation coupled with SEC oversight
authority.450 The two justifications offered for self-regulation were "that
business would have a more specialized knowledge of current and abusive
strategies and that the task was ultimately beyond the SEC's resources to
oversee." 451 The benefits of adopting a self-regulatory model are typically
associated with supplemental government oversight to aid in eliminating
cases of market failure and establishing "a forum for firms to compete with
each other in policing themselves." 452
Verret uses strategic behavior game theory to demonstrate how the
SEC's mandate of the creation of an SRO for hedge funds could be an
"effective solution to the free rider problem of industry reputability" and
also could "help foster a healthy Nash equilibrium to deter fraud in the
441. Id.




446. Id. at 817-18.
447. Id. at 818.
448. Id.
449. Id.
450. See supra Part I.C.3.
451. Verret, supra note 151, at 818.
452. Id. at 819.
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hedge fund management industry." 453 Before exploring the two models
that Verret proposes, it is important to understand the situations he creates
and the theories underlying his models. First, Verret uses the term "Nash
equilibrium," which is a central solution concept in game theory that is
based on the principle that
the combination of strategies that players are likely to choose is one in
which no player could do better by choosing a different strategy given the
[strategy] the other choose[s]. A pair of strategies will form a Nash
equilibrium if each strategy is one that cannot be improved upon given the
other strategy. 454
Thus, "[t]he strategy of each player must be a best response to the strategies
of the other."455
Another important concept that Verret uses is that of "signaling," which
is defined as "[s]trategy choices by those who possess nonverifiable
information that convey information." 456 A problem arises in game theory
when one party possesses "private, nonverifiable information that neither
the other party nor a third party can acquire directly." 457 Therefore, even if
the party with private information is forced to disclose, there is no way of
telling whether their disclosure is truthful. The best solution available to
uninformed parties is to "draw inferences from the actions that the informed
party takes." 458  However, a court or government entity could have an
important impact under these situations "by limiting the actions that parties
can take or attaching consequences" to certain actions but not others.459
These actions by courts or government authorities could therefore "affect
not only what actions are taken, but what inferences can be drawn from
those actions." 460 This concept explains why the SEC's involvement would
be necessary. The SEC would have to establish and maintain the SRO
because creation of "a regulatory regime that could effectively signal
fiduciary duty violations to investors would require government
authority." 461 As previously discussed, hedge funds are highly secretive
about their activities and, without government involvement, the funds
would not have any incentive to join the SRO or follow its guidelines. The
SEC's role would be "to make membership in the SRO mandatory, or at
453. Id. at 820. "Strategic behavior arises when two or more individuals interact and each
individual's decision turns on what that individual expects the others to do." DOUGLAS G.
BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 1 (1994).
The theories addressing this strategic behavior can "offer insights into how legal rules affect
the way people behave." Id.
454. BAIRD ET AL., supra note 453, at 310 (emphasis omitted).






461. Verret, supra note 151, at 819.
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least desirable, because only in that event will the equilibrium forces come
into effect. '462
For the purposes of the model situations, Verret defines "fiduciary duty
violations" (FDV) as "investment managers profiting at the expense of
investors absent contractual agreement (i.e., not fees). '463 The cost that
Verret highlights is the cost to a firm's reputation, although he points out
that there may not necessarily be a direct correlation between firms that
engage in fraudulent activity and reputation costs.
In the first and most basic model, Verret assumes that there are no
information asymmetries between the investors and the managers. Without
an SRO, "[a] single firm may find it profitable to engage in fraudulent
behavior, where the profit ... exceeds its allocation of industry reputation
cost."' 4 6 4 If an SRO were limited to deciding between whether to allow
FDV or to stop FDV, the SRO would allow fraud where the sum of the
firm's profit was greater than the sum of the firm's costs. However, "where
fraud allows managers to profit at the expense of investors, reputation costs
have to at least equal profits from fraud. In such an instance, it would not
be profitable for an SRO to allow fraud."'465 Under this model, no
regulation would be required; but it is not a realistic example.466
Information asymmetries do exist; the hedge fund industry is notorious for
being highly secretive and disclosing very little to investors about
investment activities. Therefore, the second model is necessary to
understanding how the creation of an SRO would alter the landscape of the
hedge fund industry.
The second model addresses a situation in which the sum of profits from
FDV is not correlated with the sum of the firm's costs. One situation that
could give rise to this situation is an information asymmetry between
managers and investors. In this scenario, "investors may not be aware of
fraud if it occurs," which would result in the total profits being greater than
the total costs, and therefore an SRO would likely want to allow FDV.4 67
In this model, the creation of an SRO could still lead to a Nash equilibrium,
or optimal outcome, "where firms would not violate individually where
they might all profit from allowing fraud together." 468  This model
separates the outcomes so that "the funds making up the SRO are divided
into two halves and are allowed to make independent decisions of whether
or not to vote to allow FDV in the hedge fund market." 469 It is further
assumed that "half of firms voting for no FDV will result in creation of a
self-regulatory regime in which investors will be able to determine whether
or not a firm is conforming to established best practices and thus whether or
462. Id. at 820.
463. Id.
464. Id.
465. Id. at 820-21.
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not the fund is engaging in FDV.' '4 70 Once the funds decide whether or not
to engage in FDV, they are ready to vote. In this situation,
[i]f either group of firms decides not to engage in FDV, and votes
accordingly, it will benefit because it will expose the other firms and thus
profit from the additional investments it can now secure from investors.
Further, if one group of firms votes not to allow FDV, then the other must
not engage in FDV and will vote to create the signal as well. Thus, the
dominant strategy for both groups of firms will be not to engage in FDV
and not vote to allow FDV.47 1
The Nash equilibrium model, according to Verret, is really about damage
control, which, in this case, results in both firms voting not to allow
FDV.4 72 The signaling mechanism is what enables the SRO to create a
Nash equilibrium because it gives firms the opportunity to overcome the
information asymmetry. 473 This theory suggests that "[a] hedge fund SRO
would have an interest in creating signals to the general market of investors
that the operational risk of fraud in hedge funds is minimal," because the
signal "would give them a competitive edge in acquiring investment capital
flows over the other asset classes with which it competes. '474
After showing how a self-regulatory model could be effective, Verret
examines alternative regulatory strategies and structures that the SEC may
use to regulate hedge funds.475 He suggests three entities that could be used
by the SEC to advance his self-regulatory thesis as a form of governance
over the hedge fund industry: the NFA, the MFA, or the NASD. 476
According to Verret, if the SEC creates an SRO, it should consider granting
it authority to license members and extend an exemption for registrants with
the SRO from any future registration requirement. 477 The SEC could use
the MFA or start a new SRO, but nonetheless, it would need to take an
470. Id.
471. Id. at 822. "The result is an equilibrium of compliance that could exceed the level of
transparency that would exist without the collective action, thus giving more sharpness and
binding effect to any best practices that may exist in the industry and providing a more cost
effective enforcement avenue for those best practices." Posting of Holger Spamann to
Harvard Law School Corporate Governance Blog, http:/Iblogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/
2008/01/24/a-self-regulation-proposal-for-the-hedge-fund-industry (Jan. 24, 2008, 11:02
EST).
472. Verret, supra note 151, at 822. Even if the firms individually would have initially
chosen to vote for FDV, "each firm would anticipate that the other firm would vote to create
the signal, because it could profit by taking market share." Id.
473. Id.
474. Id. at 823 ("In effect, not only will individual fund managers want a signal about
their low operational risk vis-A-vis their internal competition for capital, they will have an
added incentive to create such a signal to aid in their external competition for capital with
other asset classes.").
475. Id. at 833.
476. Id.
477. Id. at 836. "[S]tatutory self-regulation subject to SEC supervision generally has
been effective in major applications only when the Commission has been willing to threaten
or actually use its regulatory authority to create incentives for securities industry regulation."
Seligman, supra note 299, at 1119.
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active role in the process of creating the SRO.4 7 8 "The five basic functions
of this SRO would be registration, standards of practice, inspection,
investigations and discipline, and budgetary and operational decision
making." 479
Verret proposes that, in order to establish a new SRO and overcome the
collective action problem faced by the majority of individual hedge funds in
coming together to form the SRO, the SEC would have to take the
following four steps.480 The first necessary step would be to obtain the
SEC's encouragement to establish the necessity for such an SRO. 4 8 1 If the
SEC were to provide these funds with a motive to submit to regulation, then
the Nash equilibrium would take effect.482 One way to accomplish this
motivation would be to allow funds "to avoid more onerous regulation by
the SEC by taking advantage of a registration exemption for SRO
members." 483 The next step the SEC would have to take is to design the
SRO's charter so that it defines the rulemaking process. 484 Similar to the
charters creating SROs like the NYSE, NASD, NFA, and the Financial
Accounting Standards Board, the SEC would need to require that no
amendments may be made to the charter without SEC approval. 485 The
third requirement is that the SEC must approve the representatives of the
rulemaking body to ensure that they encompass "a representative sample of
the hedge fund industry" and "representatives that engage in a variety of
fund strategies." 486 Lastly, "the SEC would need to establish in the SRO's
charter that, though the rulemaking body could be composed of individuals
with industry ties, a separate body within the organization would need
independent authority to enforce violations of the SRO's rules." 487 In the
hedge fund SRO, the decision-making body would be composed "of
individuals with a working knowledge of the hedge fund world, but
independent of industry ties." 488 This result could be achieved through the
SEC obtaining a veto power "over appointments to the SRO's regulatory
wing." 489 Also, consistent with a reform the that NYSE adopted in 2003,
there should be a chief regulatory officer reporting directly to the
rulemaking body.490
478. Verret, supra note 151, at 836.






485. Id. at 836-37.
486. Id. at 837. The need for SEC approval "would also ensure that, as the landscape of
the hedge fund industry changed, the SRO rulemaking body membership continued to
represent the disparate players well." Id.
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III. THE FUTURE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE NEW ANTIFRAUD RULE
This part argues that the New Antifraud Rule is an ineffective way to
protect investors in hedge funds. Part III.A predicts that the overly broad
language of the rule and the Commission's lack of a scienter requirement
will likely lead to it being successfully challenged. Part III.B suggests that,
even if the rule were to withstand judicial scrutiny, the rule lacks a reporting
requirement that prevents it from addressing the original problem posed:
that fraud in hedge funds can only be detected after investors have lost their
money. For these reasons, the protection offered by this new rule is
ineffective. Part III.C highlights the various problems with SEC regulation
of hedge fund fraud. Finally, Part III.D argues that, without additional
regulatory power, the best protection for investors will come through self-
regulation, whether it be through internally adopted best practices-such as
those offered by Best Practices for Investors, the Hedge Fund Industry
Report, or the MFA's Sound Practices-or through the creation of an SRO
by the SEC for the hedge fund industry.
A. Validity of the New Antifraud Rule
If challenged, the new Antifraud Rule is likely to face a similar fate as
the SEC's Hedge Fund Rule did in Goldstein. As previously explained, the
SEC adopted rule 206(4)-8 under section 206(4), which directs the
Commission to adopt rules and regulations that "define[] and prescribe
means reasonably designed to prevent[] such acts, practices, and courses of
business as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative." 491 In the Adopting
Release of rule 206(4)-8, the SEC supported the broad scope of the rule by
stating that "Congress expected that [the SEC] would use the authority
provided by section 206(4) to 'promulgate general antifraud rules capable
of flexibility."' 492
Despite the legislative history cited by the SEC, the language under
section 206(4) clearly requires that the Commission "define[] and prescribe
means reasonably designed to prevent[] such acts, practices and courses of
business as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative." 493 The first part of
the rule, 206(4)-8(a)(1), could reasonably be interpreted by a court to
adequately define what constitutes fraud under section 206(4). However,
the second part of the rule, 206(4)-8(a)(2) does not define or prescribe what
conduct would be fraudulent under the rule, and therefore may be
susceptible to challenge on the grounds that the Commission's authority
under section 206(4) is not broad enough to create such a provision.
Rule 206(4)-8(a)(1) prohibits any investment adviser to a pooled
investment vehicle from "mak[ing] any untrue statement of a material fact,"
or from "omit[ting] to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
491. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2006); see supra Part I.C.2.
492. SEC Release: Antifraud Rule, supra note 38, at 44,757 (quoting S. REP. No. 86-
1760, at 4 (1960)).
493. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (emphasis added); see supra Part I.C.2.
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made . . . not misleading[] to any investor or prospective investor in the
pooled investment vehicle. '494 The issue before a court reviewing this part
of the rule would seem to be whether the rule's prohibition on "[m]ak[ing]
any untrue statement of a material fact or omit[ting] to state a material fact"
is an adequate definition to specify conduct that is "fraudulent, deceptive, or
manipulative." 495  In the New Antifraud Rule's Adopting Release, the
Commission noted that rule 206(4)-8(a)(1) is very similar to those in many
of the antifraud laws and rules under the securities laws. 496 Also, the
Commission provides advisers with examples of what the new rule
prohibits.497 Although the language of this rule, in comparison to other
valid and long-standing laws, would suggest that it is within the
Commission's authority, the fact that it does not require a showing of
scienter for a violation may influence a court to decide otherwise.
The second part of the rule, 206(4)-8(a)(2) prohibits advisers to pooled
investment vehicles from "[o]therwise engag[ing] in any act, practice, or
course of business that is fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative with
respect to any investor or prospective investor in the pooled investment
vehicle." 498 As noted by Commissioner Atkins, the provision is almost as
broad as the statute giving the Commission authority to make rules to
define fraud. 499  Although the SEC should not have to provide
"prophylactic rules that explicitly identify conduct that would be fraudulent
under the new rule," a rule created through the authority of an enabling
provision should be different in some material aspect to justify its
creation. 500 Under this part of the rule, the SEC did not provide a single
example of what would constitute fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative
conduct. The Commission argued that providing examples of what conduct
would be fraudulent under the rule "could provide a roadmap for those
wishing to engage in fraudulent conduct. ' 50 1 This argument is inconsistent
with the release as a whole because the Commission provided examples of
what would be prohibited under the first part of the rule and also gave
examples in a different part of the release to demonstrate the rule's
applicability to both current and prospective investors. 502 Therefore, it is
unclear how providing examples for one part of the rule would create a
"roadmap" for violators, while providing examples for another part would
not.
494. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-8(a)(1) (2008).
495. Id.; see also ABA Letter, supra note 313, at 3.
496. SEC Release: Antifraud Rule, supra note 38, at 44,759 (listing various antifraud
laws and rules, including rule I Ob-5 under the Exchange Act).
497. Id.
498. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-8(a)(2).
499. See supra note 373 and accompanying text.
500. SEC Release: Antifraud Rule, supra note 38, at 44,759 (citing ABA Letter, supra
note 313; ICI Letter, supra note 312; Schulte Letter, supra note 315; Sullivan & Cromwell
Letter, supra note 311).
501. Id.
502. Id. at 44,758-59.
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Since the New Antifraud Rule is so broadly phrased, it fails to identify
"the types of acts, practices, and courses of business that are fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative." 503 As pointed out by the comment letters, this
could lead to confusion in its application and result in unintended and
adverse consequences, such as decreased transparency. If advisers are
unclear as to what is prohibited, they may be generally fearful of
misspeaking to investors and prospective investors if that communication is
not necessary. This fear also is raised by the lack of a scienter requirement.
The Commission enacted the rule to protect investors; 504 however, if it
creates uncertainty for hedge fund advisers, legitimate communications will
decrease. The costs of leaving out the scienter requirement, even if
determined to be consistent with the case law, may outweigh the benefits,
yielding severe unintended consequences.
In addition to the challenges posed by the sweeping breadth of the new
rule, it is likely to be successfully challenged due to its lack of a scienter
requirement. The Commission justifies its decision to include negligent
conduct based on the wording "acts, practices, and courses of business as
are .. .deceptive." 50 5 However, as Commissioner Atkins contended, the
separation of terms is not consistent with the principles of statutory
construction according to the Supreme Court. 50 6
The Commission's interpretation of the term "manipulative" in a way
that differs from the Supreme Court's interpretation should also call into
question the validity of the rule.50 7 The Court stated in Hochfelder that the
term "manipulative" is "virtually a term of art" that "connotes intentional or
willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or
artificially affecting the price of securities." 50 8 The applicability of this
language to the interpretation of rule 206(4)-8 is particularly persuasive
since both rules are antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws. The
Commission's interpretation of the rule suggests that its fate may be similar
to that of the original Hedge Fund Rule that was struck down in
Goldstein.509 The court in Goldstein made it very clear that the SEC cannot
interpret words of a statute however it wishes.510
Although Steadman held that "scienter is not required under section
206(4)," a showing of intent should be required for rule 206(4)-8.511 First,
503. Id. at 44,757.
504. See generally Part I.C.2.
505. SEC Release: Antifraud Rule, supra note 38, at 44,762 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
506. Id.
507. See supra notes 332-35 and accompanying text.
508. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976); see also supra notes 332-35
and accompanying text.
509. See supra Parts I.C.1, II.A.2
510. Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 882 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ("That the Commission
wanted a hook on which to hang more comprehensive regulation of hedge funds may be
understandable. But the Commission may not accomplish its objective by a manipulation of
meaning.").
511. SEC v. Steadman, 967 F.2d 636, 647 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
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it should be noted that the Steadman decision is from the D.C. Circuit court
and therefore is not binding on other jurisdictions and has not been affirmed
by the Supreme Court. Commissioner Atkins and those who wrote
comment letters correctly pointed out several potential problems with the
Steadman court's analysis. For example, the Supreme Court emphasized
the terms 'operate' or 'would operate' in its Aaron decision. However,
neither of these words appear in section 206(4), which instead uses the
affirmative word "is." The difference in word choice should distinguish a
course of conduct that "operates" as a fraud from a course of business that
is itself a fraud. Fraud is defined as a "knowing misrepresentation of the
truth or concealment of a material fact."'512 Therefore, it seems that conduct
that is itself fraudulent would require a "knowing misrepresentation ... or
concealment., 513
Also, as discussed, the term "manipulative" has a definite meaning
within the federal securities laws, and the fact that the term is used in
section 206(4) and not used in section 17(a)(3) should distinguish the two
statutes. 514
As the law currently stands, the SEC cannot force disclosure by hedge
fund managers to their investors.515  Although the general idea of
preventing and punishing fraudulent communications with, and conduct
toward, investors is a valid one, the broad language and lack of a scienter
requirement may only serve to discourage communications between
investors and their advisers. This would negate the underlying purpose for
the rule.
B. The SEC's Need for More Power from Congress
If the New Antifraud Rule does withstand judicial scrutiny, it still does
not provide strong protection for investors in hedge funds. The fraud
problems raised by the SEC's Staff Report are not addressed by this new
rule.516 As previously discussed, the report found that the major difficulty
in protecting investors in hedge funds was that the Commission was only
able to take action after it received relevant information from third parties-
such as investors-and only after they had already suffered significant
losses.517 Therefore, the New Antifraud Rule, although it reaffirms the
Commission's power to bring such actions, does not create any substantial
protections for these investors.
Arguably, in order to be able to detect misconduct at an earlier stage, the
Commission would need access to information it currently cannot access.
In the wake of Goldstein, it seems that federal legislation requiring hedge
fund registration may be the only way for the Commission to have the
512. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 685 (8th ed. 2004).
513. Id.
514. See supra notes 332-35 and accompanying text.
515. See supra Part I.A.2.
516. See supra notes 108-15 and accompanying text.
517. See Part I.B.2.
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ability to police and detect hedge fund fraud. Congress could amend the
Advisers Act to expand the regulatory power of the SEC, although it has
declined to do so. 518
C. Problems with SEC Regulation
Further, even if hedge funds were required to register with the SEC, it is
questionable whether SEC regulation would be able to protect investors
from fraud. Some argue that the availability of such information would not
increase protection. 519 Commissioner Atkins has stated that the SEC does
not even have the resources to regulate the mutual fund industry, an
industry that the SEC should currently be regulating.5 20 Moreover, the
Commission also suffers from inadequate staffing. This suggests that the
SEC may not have the capacity to regulate these funds, and investors
believing that the industry is adequately regulated may operate under a false
sense of security that could harm them more than protect them.
One serious issue that should be considered before any regulations are
implemented is the effect these regulations may have on hedge funds
moving to other jurisdictions. Once these funds move out of the United
States' jurisdiction, investors will either not be able to invest in them or will
be afforded no protection or remedies under the federal securities laws.
Therefore, the consequences of the regulations may defeat their original
purpose.
In addition, the rapid innovations within the hedge fund industry and the
need to retain secrecy of their investment strategies make it harder to
regulate than other areas. 521 Given the potential problems that may result
from regulation, decreasing hedge fund fraud by implementing SEC
regulations is not the most effective means for protecting investors.
D. Protecting Investors Through Self-Regulation
Fraud, by its nature, is hard to detect and, as the case law and Staff
Report demonstrate, perpetrators of fraud in hedge funds go to great lengths
to conceal their fraudulent activities.5 22 As demonstrated by the Bayou
case, hedge fund managers who commit fraud create false documentation-
including false accounting statements and other reports to customers,
confirmations, and pricing sheets.523 Without the SEC having the ability to
require registration by hedge funds and gain access to their records, an
antifraud rule will not provide sufficient protection for investors.
Absent government regulation, the best protection for investors is likely
through self-regulation within the industry. One way to accomplish this is
518. See Verret, supra note 151, at 810.
519. See, e.g., id.; supra note 131.
520. Id.
521. Id.
522. STAFF REPORT ON THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS, supra note 33, at 74.
523. Id.
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for hedge funds to voluntarily follow a set of industry standards such as the
PWG's reports-Best Practices for Investors and the Hedge Fund Industry
Report-or the MFA's Sound Practices. The recommendations in these
best practices are good examples of how firms could effectively structure
themselves to make this type of self-regulation protect investors. The
recommendations, if followed, would increase the amount of information
investors receive from managers. Also, the Model Due Diligence
Questionnaire could be helpful for investors looking to invest in a hedge
fund. It would help them understand their investment, the strategies used,
and the risks involved. 524 Adoption of these recommendations would be a
good starting point for protecting investors; however, this may not be
enough. This form of self-regulation relies entirely on the fund's accurate
disclosure to investors in their due diligence. The recommendations do not
require outside accountants or alternative means to verify that the
information supplied by hedge funds to investors is accurate.
The benefit of this form of self-regulation seems to be dependent on the
investors. If investors request or even require that funds adhere to the
recommendations, funds that do not adopt the recommendations would be
disadvantaged. Wealthy investors and institutional investors may have
market power that would enable them to induce hedge funds to follow the
recommendations and even to verify the accuracy of their disclosures. This
market power is displayed by the fact that many hedge funds voluntarily
register with the SEC. This is not because they are required by securities
laws to register but rather because some institutional investors condition
their investment on such registration. Therefore, investors with enough
influence could certainly demand that hedge funds comply with these
recommendations or provide independent audits. One drawback to this
solution, however, is that it does not protect the less influential investors.
The most effective way to protect all hedge fund investors, while
continuing to reap the market benefits that these funds provide, is through
the creation of an SRO. An SRO for the hedge fund industry would be
better suited to police the industry than the SEC because the SEC does not
have the means or manpower to effectively regulate the industry. The
creation of an SRO could address the concerns over risks associated with
hedge funds having to disclose their investment strategies. An SRO could
also require independent auditing to ensure that the information disclosed is
accurate and that the funds are following the valuation procedures provided
to investors.
The SEC would have to delegate its regulatory power to the SRO and
either provide an incentive to join or make membership mandatory. As
outlined by Verret, the SEC would need to take the necessary precautions to
avoid the negative consequences that can flow from allowing an industry to
regulate itself.525 Like the current SROs, the new hedge fund SRO would
524. See supra Part I.D.2.
525. See supra Part II.C.2.
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be responsible for "registration, standards of practice, inspection,
investigations and discipline, and budgetary and operational decision
making."526
The hedge fund SRO could follow the structure of the NFA, the SRO for
the U.S. futures industry. 527 The NFA mandates membership and operates
at no cost to taxpayers because it is financed by membership dues.528 The
NFA also has stringent screening requirements that firms must pass to
register, including fingerprinting and background checks. 529 This would
help protect hedge fund investors from managers that defraud them by lying
about their background and qualifications. The rules created for a hedge
fund SRO would have to be industry specific and should include disclosure
requirements such as those recommended by the MFA. In addition, these
internal regulations should require regular independent audits and proper
valuation procedures. Consistent with the NFA's practice, the hedge fund
SRO would have to establish reporting requirements and perform its own
random audits to monitor compliance with the established rules. 530 In
addition, this hedge fund SRO should adopt the NFA philosophy that
"investor protection begins with investor education. '' 531 Even with an SRO
regulating the hedge fund industry, investors should be responsible for
making informed decisions by performing their own due diligence, self-
education, and monitoring of their investments.
If such a structure had been in place prior to the Bayou fraud, the
investors would have been aware that the accounting firm Marino created
was not a legitimate accounting firm and that the audits were neither
independent nor accurate. In the case of Amaranth Advisers, SDCERA
would have been. on notice that the fund had altered its investment
strategies if routine disclosure had been required. Ultimately, there is no
guaranteed protection from fraud. However, an SRO could offer greater
protection for hedge fund investors than regulation by the SEC.
CONCLUSION
Fraud is particularly difficult to uncover, whether in a registered or
unregistered investment company. Whether additional regulation will be
necessary to protect investors from their advisers is an ongoing controversy
that the government will continue to investigate; the resolution may depend
on the administration in office. Whether this new rule will withstand
judicial scrutiny or protect investors is still uncertain. One way the hedge
fund industry may be able to prevent government regulation would be to
526. Verret, supra note 151, at 836 (citing Seligman, supra note 299, at 1124); see also
supra Part II.C.2.
527. See generally National Futures Association, About NFA, http://www.nfa.futures.org/
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establish a self-regulatory framework that instills confidence in the industry
and provides protection to investors. Another alternative is for the SEC to
get involved in a different capacity-by creating and supervising an SRO to
police the hedge fund industry. Currently, with no regulations in place, the
investors can best protect themselves by conducting their own due diligence
and closely monitoring their investments.
